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*

INTRODUCTION
Klaus Peter Berger describes contractual gap-filling by arbitrators
as an important and controversial issue that has confounded
observers of international commercial arbitration for over a
generation. 1 Consistent with Berger’s assessment, the issue of arbitral
gap-filling reached the United States Supreme Court in Stolt-Nielsen
S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 2 a 2010 decision that leading
observers have described as incorporating “startling,” 3 “troubling,”4
“mystifying,” 5 and ultimately “crabbed” 6 views about the powers of
arbitrators to fill gaps in arbitration agreements and contracts.
Faced with such alarming pronouncements, one may seek
guidance from the famous admonition to “Mind the Gap.”7

* Professor, Wayne State Law School; Of Counsel, Miller Canfield; Vice Chair, Institute for
Transnational Arbitration; Fellow, American Bar Foundation; Elected Member, American Law
Institute; Winner of the Smit-Lowenfeld Prize (2013).
1. See Klaus Peter Berger, Power of Arbitrators to Fill Gaps and Revise Contracts to
Make Sense, 17 ARB. INT’L 1, 1 (2001) (“The search for the power of international arbitrators
to fill gaps and revise contracts is of extreme practical relevance. It also belongs to the most
controversial issues of arbitral doctrine of the past three decades.”); see also JULIAN D M LEW
QC ET AL., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 652 (2003)
(describing gap-filling and contractual adaptation as issues that have “been of paramount
importance and widely debated” in the field of international arbitration).
2. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010).
3. Alan Scott Rau, Arbitral Power and the Limits of Contract: The New Trilogy, 22 AM.
REV. INT’L ARB. 435, 473 (2011).
4. Id. at 454.
5. Id. at 469.
6. Christopher R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, Contract and Procedure, 94 MARQ.
L. REV. 1103, 1110 (2011).
7. The phrase “Mind the Gap” represents an iconic message painted in the London
underground as a means of warning passengers to take care around a gap between the platform
and the subway cars. See Alexandra R. Harrington, Don’t Mind the Gap: The Rise of Individual
Complaint Mechanisms Within International Human Rights Treaties, 22 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 153, 153 (2012); see also Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking
About Law as Language, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2459, 2470 (1989) (“The traveler on the London
subway, the ‘Tube’ or ‘Underground,’ hears a warning whenever a train pulls into a stop:
‘MIND THE GAP,’ intones a forbidding, mechanical voice. The warning causes the traveler to
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Embedded in these words lie three principles critical to navigating
the doctrinal terrain of gap-filling by arbitrators. 8 First, gaps have
become a more common feature of modern contracts that establish
complex, long-term arrangements among parties who inhabit
increasingly global and unstable fields of endeavor. 9 Second, when
encountering those gaps, courts and arbitrators should strive to
protect the legal interests of contracting parties. And, third, that
undertaking requires considerable attention to nuance.
Seeking to elaborate the points just made, Part I clarifies the
scope of inquiry by defining what constitutes a genuine “gap” in the
context of contracts and arbitration agreements. It also explains the
common reasons for the presence of such gaps. Building on those
observations, Part II surveys the evolution of doctrine related to
gap-filling in the context of substantive laws governing contracts in
the United States, and laws governing arbitral procedure worldwide.
In the process, it explores two different visions of the parties’ interest
in freedom of contract. Subsequently, Part III uses Stolt-Nielsen and
criticisms of that decision to illustrate the need for attentiveness in
specifying the gap-filling powers of arbitrators. In addition to
traversing the Supreme Court’s clumsy framing of certain points,
Part III asserts that critics themselves have overlooked important
context and passages of the Court’s opinion, both of which suggest a
more generous (or at least less “crabbed”) view of arbitrators’
powers to fill gaps in contracts and arbitration agreements. Seeking
to keep pace with assessments of the Supreme Court’s evolving
jurisprudence, Part IV addresses contentions that the 2013 decision
in Oxford Health Plans, LLC v. Sutter circumvents the Court’s
jurisprudence on gap-filling by vesting arbitrators with virtually
unrestricted powers to pluck fundamental terms for arbitration
agreements
out
of
thin
air
under
the
rubric
of
contractual interpretation.

notice that the platform and threshold of the train car are not a continuous surface, that a
narrow but potentially perilous gap separates the two.”).
8. See Harrington, supra note 7, at 153 (“This simple warning is applicable in
many contexts.”).
9. See infra notes 36, 43–44 and accompanying text.
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I. GAPS
Any discussion regarding the gap-filling powers of arbitrators
must begin by identifying (1) the situations involving genuine gaps,
and (2) the common reasons for the presence of such gaps in
commercial agreements. Starting with the definition of genuine gaps,
a recent paper by Alan Rau illustrates the potential for confusion,
and the extent to which even this basic question remains a source of
controversy. In his paper, Rau leads with the theoretical possibilities
that gaps could mean everything (in the sense that all contracts are
incompletely specified) or nothing at all (in the sense that the
latticework of contract law provides an answer to all questions that
arise among the parties). 10
Ultimately, Rau settles on the proposition that gaps represent
nothing in particular. To the contrary, he asserts that gap-filling lies
on the same continuum as contractual interpretation; 11 that

10. Alan Scott Rau, “Gap Filling” by Arbitrators, in INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, CONGRESS SERIES, 2014 (2015).
11. See id. at 39 (referring to the “barely perceptible” step between interpretation and
gap-filling); see also Rau, supra note 3, at 463.
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interpretation and gap-filling both aim to specify the obligations of
the parties; 12 that they differ only in degree; 13 and that any doctrinal
separation between the two lacks coherence, stability, and utility. 14
Viewed from this set of assumptions, Rau implies that Supreme
Court’s recent treatment of interpretation and gap-filling in Green
Tree Financial Corporation v. Bazzle, 15 Stolt-Nielsen, 16 and Oxford
Health Plans 17 should have reflected the linear exposition of a single
theme. 18 Instead, the Court broadly defined the interpretive powers
of arbitral tribunals in Bazzle, recognized the existence of strict limits
on their gap-filling powers in Stolt-Nielsen, and returned to embrace
an almost limitless interpretive power in Oxford Health Plans, a
sequence that Rau describes as encompassing a “dizzying series of
twists and turns.” 19
On the one hand, Rau’s points seem incontestable. One can
describe interpretation and gap-filling as involving a common effort
to specify the obligations of the parties. On the other hand,
differences in degree matter. For example, a series of tasks may all
involve the splitting of wood, but the process and the tools may
change dramatically depending on whether one splits twigs,
branches, or logs. Even focusing on logs, it makes a huge difference
whether one splits southern yellow pine (which weighs roughly fiftytwo pounds per cubic foot), 20 or quebracho (which weighs over
seventy-seven pounds per cubic foot and takes its name from the
Spanish words for “axe-breaker”). 21

12. Rau, supra note 10, at 974–75; see also Rau, supra note 3, at 464–65.
13. Rau, supra note 10, at 974; Rau, supra note 3, at 464.
14. Rau, supra note 10, at 976–77; see also Rau, supra note 3, at 467.
15. 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
16. 559 U.S. 662 (2010).
17. 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013).
18. See Rau, supra note 10, at 953 (emphasizing that the three cases were “all quite
similar” and “all pos[ed] more or less the same question”).
19. See Rau, supra note 10, at 956–57, 971–84, 991–1004.
20. Wood Species–Weight at Different Moisture Contents, THE ENGINEERING
TOOLBOX, http://www.engineeringtoolbox.com/weigt-wood-d_821.html (last visited Sept.
16, 2015).
21. See Quebracho, THE WOOD DATABASE, http://www.wood-database.com/lumberidentification/hardwoods/quebracho (last visited Sept. 16, 2015) (also mentioning the
wood’s “high cutting resistance,” as well as its “pronounced blunting effect on cutters”).
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The fact is that interpretation and gap-filling involve distinct
undertakings. 22 Interpretation requires an examination of the parties’
intent based on express terms, 23 testimony regarding their
intentions, 24 implied terms drawn from the overall structure of the
agreement, 25 course of performance, 26 course of dealing, 27 and usage

22. See Lerner v. Lerner Corp., 750 A.2d 709, 715 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000)
(indicating that “the supplying of an omitted term is not technically within the Restatement’s
definition of interpretation”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 cmt. c (AM.
LAW INST. 1981) (explaining that “the supplying of an omitted term is not within the
[Restatement’s] definition of interpretation”); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 480 (4th
ed. 2004) (emphasizing that “[c]ourts must resolve . . . disputes arising from omission by some
process other than that of interpretation”); JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON
CONTRACTS 485 (5th ed. 2011) (“When an omitted term is supplied by a court, it is not
interpreting the contract . . . .”).
23. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(“Where the parties have attached the same meaning to a promise or agreement or a term
thereof, it is interpreted in accordance with that meaning.”); RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS
93 (2010) (“First, we try to establish if both parties subjectively attached the same meaning to
the term . . . .”); FARNSWORTH, supra note 22, at 445 (indicating that “the resolution of the
dispute begins . . . with the meanings attached by each party at the time the contract was
made”); see also Misano di Navigazione, SpA v. United States, 968 F.2d 273, 275 (2d Cir.
1992) (“The parties’ manifest purpose . . . controls the interpretation of the
contract provisions.”).
24. FARNSWORTH, supra note 22, at 453. The parol evidence rule does not affect
recourse to extrinsic evidence for purposes of interpretation. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 214(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1981); FARNSWORTH, supra note 22, at 461; MURRAY,
supra note 22, at 442. Likewise, the plain meaning rule does not restrict introduction of
extrinsic evidence for purposes of interpreting terms that reasonably support different
meanings. FARNSWORTH, supra note 22, at 462–69.
25. See Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y. 1917) (recognizing
that a reasonable-efforts term did not appear “in so many words,” but concluding that term
could be “fairly . . . implied” in fact because the “writing [was] ‘instinct with [such] an
obligation,’ imperfectly expressed”) (quoting McCall Co. v. Wright, 117 N.Y.S. 775, 779
(App. Div. 1909)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST.
1981) (indicating that “interpretation may be enough” when “there is tacit agreement or a
common tacit assumption or where a term can be supplied by logical deduction from agreed
terms and the circumstances”); MURRAY, supra note 22, at 467 (“Numerous cases indicate
that all the different parts of the agreement must be viewed together . . . and each part
interpreted in light of all the other parts.”).
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 202(4)–(5), 203(b) (AM. LAW INST.
1981); FARNSWORTH, supra note 22, at 472–73; MURRAY, supra note 22, at 469, 475–
76, 478–79.
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 202(5), 203(b) (AM. LAW INST.
1981) FARNSWORTH, supra note 22, at 470; MURRAY, supra note 22, at 475–76, 477–78; see
also BARNETT, supra note 23, at 93–94 (identifying course of performance and course of
dealing as sources of evidence regarding the parties’ subjective intent).
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of trade. 28 In rare cases, even this broad range of tools does not
permit discernment of the parties’ intent. 29 This marks the place
where interpretation ends and gap-filling begins. According to
Section 204 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which the
Supreme Court quoted in Stolt-Nielsen, 30 gap-filling has virtually
nothing to do with intent. 31 Gap-filling aims neither to identify the
parties’ intent, which cannot be discerned by any of the usual
sources, nor even to speculate what the parties would have intended
in a hypothetical bargain. 32 To the contrary, when gap-filling, courts
take the wheel from the parties and supply reasonable terms based
on “community standards of fairness and policy.” 33
The point is that gap-filling turns its face from the emphasis on
intent and towards the imposition of standards based on external

28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 202(5), 203(b) (AM. LAW INST.
1981); FARNSWORTH, supra note 22, at 470–72; MURRAY, supra note 22, at 475–77; see also
FARNSWORTH, supra note 22, at 453 (explaining that interpretation requires consideration of
all relevant circumstances, including “any applicable course of dealing, course of performance,
or usage”).
29. Most observers recognize that interpretive tools generally provide the guidance
required in the absence of express terms. See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO
ON CONTRACTS 46–47 (5th ed. 2003) [hereinafter CALAMARI & PERILLO] (indicating that
where contracts are silent as to express terms, “there is a strong possibility that a term may
either be implied from the surrounding circumstances,” including “trade or local usages, a
course of dealing between the parties, prior to the agreement, and a course of performance
after it”); FARNSWORTH, supra note 22, at 204 (affirming that “an agreement may be fleshed
out by usages to which the parties are subject, by a course of dealing between the parties prior
to their agreement, or by a course of performance between them after their agreement”).
It should be evident that this Article addresses only situations involving gaps with respect to
material terms. Gaps with respect to immaterial terms do not raise significant problems for
the application and enforcement of contracts. See MURRAY, supra note 22, at 95 (“Courts have
never experienced much difficulty enforcing agreements . . . though the parties have . . . left
relatively insignificant matters for future determination.”); see also CALAMARI & PERILLO,
supra, at 29, at 51–52 (“The traditional rule is that if the contract is not reasonably certain as
to its material terms there is a fatal indefiniteness and the agreement is void. . . . Indefiniteness
as to an immaterial term is not fatal.”) (emphasis in original); FARNSWORTH, supra note 22, at
212 (recognizing that “a court may be more willing to supply a term if the court regards the
term as relatively unimportant”).
30. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 685 (2010).
31. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(“The parties to an agreement may entirely fail to foresee the situation which later arises and
gives rise to a dispute; then they can have no expectations with respect to that situation, and a
search for their meaning with respect to it is fruitless.”) (emphasis added).
32. See id. § 204 cmt. d (admonishing courts not to “analyze a hypothetical model of
the bargaining process”).
33. Id.
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yardsticks. It should be obvious that the divergence in perspectives is
significant, entrenched in doctrine, involves different tasks, and will
produce different outcomes. 34
As suggested above, genuine gaps on material terms may not
occur frequently. 35 But they do occur, and perhaps with greater
frequency in the modern economy. 36 According to leading sources,
three reasons lie at the heart of the gaps that do arise. First, parties
may foresee a situation, but resolve to deal with it in a subsequent
agreement. 37 This represents the paradigmatic “agreement to agree.”
Second, the parties may foresee a situation, but fail to address it in
their agreement, 38 because the issue seems insignificant, 39 discussion
of the topic seems unpleasant, 40 or negotiations may delay
implementation of the transaction. 41 Third, the parties simply may
not foresee a situation. 42 For transactions characterized by complex,
long-term relationships among parties who operate in increasingly
global and unstable markets, the probabilities of such
lapses increase. 43

34. See id. § 204 cmt. c (emphasizing that “the supplying of an omitted term is not
within the definition of interpretation”).
35. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
36. See Giorgio Bernini, Report: Adaptation of Contracts, in NEW TRENDS IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE ROLE OF
ARBITRAL AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS 193, 193 (Pieter Sanders ed., 1983) (observing that the
“context of contemporary business and economic reality” makes “unavoidable” the
circumstances that give “birth to contracts which are affected by gaps and
contractual omissions”).
37. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 29, at 45; see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 22,
at 119–20.
38. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 29, at 44–45 (describing the situation where
the “parties are silent as to a material term”).
39. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n Coffeyville v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 445, 996 P.2d 821, 829–30
(Kan. 2000); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1981);
FARNSWORTH, supra note 22, at 482; MURRAY, supra note 22, at 484.
40. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n Coffeyville, 996 P.2d at 829–30; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 204 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1981); FARNSWORTH, supra note 22, at 481.
41. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n Coffeyville, 996 P.2d at 829–30; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 204 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1981); MURRAY, supra note 22, at 484.
42. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n Coffeyville, 996 P.2d at 830; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 204 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1981); FARNSWORTH, supra note 22, at 480;
MURRAY, supra note 22, at 484.
43. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 22, at 482 (emphasizing that “the risk of unforeseen
and unforeseeable developments grows as the lifetime of the contract increases”); Bernini,
supra note 36, at 193 (emphasizing “that the relevance of the problem at issue is strictly
related to the growing importance of long-term business transactions, with particular reference
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This last observation holds particular relevance for international
commercial arbitration, because that mechanism represents the
leading means of dispute-settlement for the complex, cross-border
transactions that seem likely to produce gaps. 44 The question then
becomes whether arbitrators possess the tools to perform the task of
gap-filling in ways that protect the legal interests of contracting
parties. As a corollary, it also seems relevant to determine whether
arbitrators possess the same, better, or worse tools than national
courts. To begin that inquiry, Part II surveys the evolution of U.S.
judicial doctrine with respect to omitted material terms, as well as
international developments regarding the powers of arbitrators to
deal with problems caused by the omission of material terms.
II. WHO MINDS THE GAPS?
As just suggested, the correlations among (1) complex, longterm, cross-border transactions, (2) prevalence of genuine
contractual gaps, and (3) agreements on international commercial
arbitration raise questions about the relative capacities of courts and
arbitrators to fill gaps in ways that protect the legal interests of
contacting parties. In other words, who minds the gaps: courts or
arbitrators? Do they have similarly effective tools at their disposal? To
answer these questions, Section II(A) reviews the development of
judicial doctrine on gap-filling in the United States, and Section
to the field of international trade and economic cooperation”). The probability of lapses seems
particularly strong in fields likely to witness rapid technological change. See FARNSWORTH,
supra note 22, at 482 n.14 (noting that “[p]articularly troublesome problems” may arise in
contexts likely to witness rapid and significant technological breakthroughs); see also Bernini,
supra note 36, at 193 (explaining that technological developments “may occur during the life
of the contract, which substantially alter the original contractual equilibrium”).
44. See NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 1–2 (5th ed. 2009) [hereinafter REDFERN & HUNTER] (explaining that
“[i]nternational arbitration has become the principal means of resolving disputes . . . in
international trade, commerce and investment,” where “millions or even hundreds of millions
of dollars are [often] at stake”); see also 1 GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 1 (2009) (“As international commerce has expanded and become more
complex, so too has the primary dispute resolution mechanism—international arbitration.”);
ANDREW TWEEDDALE & KEREN TWEEDDALE, ARBITRATION OF COMMERCIAL DISPUTES 39,
62 (2005) (noting that arbitration represents “the preferred method of dispute resolution for
international commercial disputes” and has experienced “exponential growth” as a result of
“globalization of commerce and development in instantaneous communications”); cf. LEW ET
AL., supra note 1, at 652 (“Often arbitrators have an ultimate task to fill gaps or revise the
contract which the parties have entered into long before the dispute has arisen.”)
(emphasis added).

8
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II(B) reviews the trajectory
commercial arbitration.

of

gap-filling

in

international

A. Do Courts Mind the Gaps?
For U.S. lawyers, Sun Printing & Publishing Ass’n v. Remington
Paper & Power Co. provides a classic introduction to judicial practice
regarding omitted material terms, due to the range of issues
canvassed and the quality of the judges who penned the majority and
dissenting opinions. 45 In that case, Sun Printing agreed to purchase
over thirty-two million pounds of newsprint from Remington Paper
over the course of sixteen months, with express terms on quality,
size, rate of delivery and dates for payments. 46 In addition, the
parties agreed on price for the first four months of performance. 47
For the remaining twelve months, they stipulated that:
the price of the paper and the length of terms for which such price
shall apply shall be agreed upon by and between the parties . . . said
price . . . to be no higher than the contract price for newsprint
charged by the Canadian Export Paper Company to . . .
large consumers. 48

Confronted by unanticipated market conditions, 49 Remington
Paper performed only for the first four months, but then refused to
tender any more newsprint on the ground that the contract was
indefinite and, thus, unenforceable due to the omission of an

45. 139 N.E. 470 (N.Y. 1923); see also Omri Ben-Shahar, A Bargaining Power Theory of
Default Rules, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 396, 402 (2009) (describing Sun Printing as a “classic
case”). Observers often describe Judge Benjamin Cardozo, the author of the majority opinion,
as one of the greatest U.S. jurists of all time, and compare his reputation to those of Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and Judge Learned Hand. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Spendrel or
Frankenstein’s Monster? The Vices and Virtues of Retrofitting in American Law, 54 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 339, 342 (2012). The author of the dissenting opinion, Judge Frederick Crane,
ascended to the New York Court of Appeals in 1920, succeeded Cardozo as a Chief Judge of
that court in 1934, served as President of New York’s Constitutional Convention of 1938, and
enjoyed a distinguished reputation in the state’s legal community. Jonathan Lippman, The
Judge and Extrajudicial Conduct: Challenges, Lessons Learned, and a Proposed Framework for
Assessing the Propriety of Pursuing Activities Beyond the Bench, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1341,
1363 (2012).
46. Sun Printing, 139 N.E. at 470.
47. Id.
48. Id. (emphasis added).
49. See id. at 471 (“Market prices in 1920 happened to rise.”).

9
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agreement on price for the remaining term. 50 During each of the
following twelve months, Sun Printing demanded delivery of two
million pounds of paper at the price charged by the Canadian Export
Paper Company, the maximum price that Remington Paper could
have demanded. 51 After Remington Paper refused to perform even
under those terms, Sun Printing sued for breach of contract. 52
Writing for a majority of the New York Court of Appeals, Judge
Benjamin Cardozo recognized that the price ceiling arguably
supplied the price term in the event that the parties could not
agree. 53 However, that still left open the time period for which any
price might remain in effect. 54 Given the presence of a rising market
throughout 1920, this “time element” became a material
consideration. 55 Because the parties had not supplied any means for
bridging that gap, Judge Cardozo held that the agreement remained
“inchoate.” 56 Although Sun Printing invited him to select a
“reasonable” time period, Cardozo wrote that Sun Printing’s
proposal would require the court “to make the contract over.”57
Alternatively, Sun Printing proposed the adoption of monthly time
periods, to which Cardozo replied, “We are not at liberty to revise
while professing to construe.” 58
Writing for the dissent, Judge Frederick Crane began by
observing that the parties clearly thought they were making a
contract involving substantial quantities and time periods, set forth
in a writing that specified a wide range of material terms in detail. 59
Given these circumstances, and the presence of “intelligent parties,”
Judge Crane wrote that “the court should spell out a binding
contract, if it be possible.” 60 With respect to the open time period,
Judge Crane identified “many answers” to the problem. 61 For

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

10
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example, the court might adopt a constant price for the duration of
the contract based on the Canadian Export Paper Company price in
effect as of December 15, 1919, the day on which the parties should
have reached agreement on open terms. 62 Alternatively, the court
might adopt a month-to-month pricing term based on the Canadian
Export Paper Company price in force on the fifteenth day of each
preceding month. 63 As a third possibility, the court might adopt a
variable pricing term tied to whatever time periods the Canadian
Export Paper Company used in setting its own prices. 64
While appealing in some respects, the menu of options presented
by Judge Crane simply reinforced Cardozo’s main point. 65 In the
absence of any contractual basis, the court had no disciplined basis
on which to supply the omitted term. Although the court might
choose any number of solutions, each one might produce vastly
different economic consequences in a rising market, 66 none of which
may have laid within the contemplation of the parties. In other
words, the court would be pulling numbers out of thin air, and that
did not constitute a judicial act. 67
When comparing the two opinions in Sun Printing, Randy
Barnett has opined that each reflects a different conception of the
parties’ legal interest in freedom of contract. 68 According to Barnett,
Judge Cardozo’s opinion rests on the idea of “freedom from
contract,” meaning that contracting involves a consensual process
and the imposition of terms by judicial fiat represents the greatest
threat to the interests of the contracting parties. 69 By contrast, Judge

62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See BARNETT, supra note 23, at 98 (“Crane’s ability to articulate numerous different
ways of filling in the gap unintentionally supported Cardozo’s conclusion that this contract was
too indefinite to be enforced.”).
66. See id. (observing that “[e]ach of Crane’s suggestions would yield a
different result”).
67. See MURRAY, supra note 22, at 96 (“It is important to emphasize the underlying
assumption of the traditional view, i.e., since the parties may subsequently fail to agree on the
postponed material term, the court would have no basis for supplying the missing term and
enforcing the contract.”).
68. BARNETT, supra note 23, at 98–99; Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default
Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821, 871 (1992).
69. BARNETT, supra note 23, at 99; Barnett, supra note 68, at 871; see also Lo Cascio v.
James V. Aquavella, M.D., P.C., 619 N.Y.S.2d 430, 432 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (“[W]ithout
[definiteness as to material terms] a court could not intervene without imposing its own
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Crane’s opinion exemplifies the principle of “freedom to contract,”
meaning that the process of contracting creates expectations, and the
strategic disturbance of those expectations by one party based on a
technicality represents the greatest threat to the interests of
contracting parties. 70 Therefore, courts should preserve the integrity
of bargains by supplying reasonable terms to fill gaps. Although the
two visions expounded by Cardozo and Crane may not seem
compatible, Barnett observes that default rules seem consistent with
both approaches because they permit courts to maintain contractual
equilibrium by filling gaps with terms likely to fall within the
contemplation of the parties. 71
Perhaps for the reasons outlined by Barnett, U.S. doctrine has
evolved along the lines suggested by Judge Crane. Thus, the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides a general rule that
judges may fill gaps by supplying reasonable terms: “When the
parties to a bargain sufficiently defined to be a contract have not
agreed with respect to a term which is essential to a determination of
their rights and duties, a term which is reasonable in the
circumstances is supplied by the court.” 72 In selecting reasonable
terms, courts should not conduct speculative inquiries into what the
parties would have agreed to had the issue occurred to them. 73 To

conception of what the parties should or might have undertaken, rather than confining itself to
a bargain to which they have mutually committed themselves.”). But see CALAMARI &
PERILLO, supra note 29, at 51 (“But, even if the parties intend to contract, if the content of
their agreement is unduly uncertain no contract is formed. This rule must be understood as a
necessary limitation on freedom of contract . . . .”).
70. BARNETT, supra note 23, at 99; Barnett, supra note 68, at 871; see also CALAMARI &
PERILLO, supra note 29, at 55 (discussing the UCC’s general provision on indefiniteness and
opining that it “is designed to prevent . . . a contracting party who is dissatisfied with a bargain
from taking refuge in the doctrine [of indefiniteness] to wriggle out of an agreement”).
71. BARNETT, supra note 23, at 99–100; Barnett, supra note 68, at 872–73, 906; see also
FARNSWORTH, supra note 22, at 486 (“If the situation is a recurring one, the term that a court
will imply may be well known and, because it accords with their expectations, the parties may
rely on it by remaining silent on the matter when making their agreement.”).
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
73. Id., § 204 cmt. d; see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 22 at 485–86 (opining that “it
is often naïve to assume that a court can determine how the parties would have dealt with [a
material issue] had they foreseen it”). However, “the probability that a particular term would
have been used if the question had been raised may be [a] factor[] in determining what term is
reasonable under the circumstances.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 cmt. d
(AM. LAW INST. 1981); see also Lerner v. Lerner Corp., 750 A.2d 709, 716 (Md. App. 2000)
(indicating that the likely expectations of the parties may represent one of the circumstances
taken into account when judging reasonableness).
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the contrary, courts “should supply . . . term[s] which comport[]
with community standards of fairness and policy.” 74 While the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) seems somewhat more
restrained in its general provision on open terms, 75 individual
sections follow the Restatement on discrete topics, such as open
price terms and the time for shipment or delivery. 76
In short, while U.S. courts traditionally refused to fill omitted
terms on the ground that the process did not constitute a judicial
act, modern trends favor judicial gap-filling based on reasonable
terms likely to fall within the contemplation of the parties.77
However, this assessment requires four qualifications. First, not all
jurisdictions have embraced the Restatement’s position on gapfilling. For example, in one large case involving two sophisticated
parties, the Texas Court of Appeals seemed to indicate that courts
cannot supply exogenous terms, but must derive all terms from the
agreement itself. Thus, the court stated:
For a contract to be enforceable, the terms of the agreement must
be ascertainable to a reasonable degree of certainty. . . . The facts of
the individual case are decisively important. . . . “The agreement
need not be so definite that all possibilities that might occur to a
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1981); see
also Nat’l Educ. Ass’n Coffeyville v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 445, 996 P.2d 821, 831 (Kan.
2000) (“Thus, it is left to this court to decide, as a matter of community standards of fairness
and policy, which of the parties is entitled to the divisible surplus.”); FARNSWORTH, supra note
22, at 486 (asserting that “it should not be hypothetical expectations or fictitious intentions,
but basic principles of justice that guide a court”).
75. See U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977) (“Even
though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the
parties have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an
appropriate remedy.”) (emphasis added). In the view of this author, the UCC’s general
provision on open terms seems more closely aligned with Judge Cardozo’s views than with
Judge Crane’s views because the emphasis on reasonable certainty seems hard to square with
the open-ended menu of solutions offered by Judge Crane. Cf. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra
note 29, at 55 (observing that it “is not clear when a court will find that ‘there is a reasonably
certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy’”) (quoting U.C.C. § 2-204(3)).
76. See U.C.C. § 2-305(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977) (“The parties
if they so intend can conclude a contract for sale even though the price is not settled. In such a
case the price is a reasonable price at the time for delivery . . . .”); see also U.C.C. § 2-309(1)
(AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977) (“The time of shipment or delivery . . . if
not . . . agreed upon shall be a reasonable time.”); MURRAY, supra note 22, at 100 (“The
UCC makes provision for numerous ‘gap-filling’ terms beyond the price term where the
parties have omitted such terms and still intend to be bound by their agreement.”).
77. See also MURRAY, supra note 22, at 93 (“Modern courts are much less willing than
their predecessors to regard indefiniteness as fatal.”).
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party in bad faith are explicitly provided for, but it must be
sufficiently complete so that parties in good faith can find in the
agreement words that will fairly define their respective duties
and liabilities. 78

Second, even in jurisdictions that have embraced the
Restatement, courts may find themselves unable to formulate any
reasonable, objective basis on which to supply particular omitted
terms. Thus, where parties have failed to specify “the kind or
quantity of goods or the specifications [for] a building contract,”
courts have refused to supply those terms because “no objective
standard can ordinarily be found in such cases.” 79
Third, many courts would still follow the particular outcome in
Sun Printing. In that case, the strongest factors supporting Judge
Cardozo’s position included the parties’ explicit consideration of
pricing terms and their conscious decision to relegate the issue to
subsequent agreements “by and between the parties.” 80 Thus, the
case involved a classic “agreement to agree.” 81 Even today, many
courts would not regard gap-fillers as sufficient to overcome the lack
of a present agreement. 82
78. Texaco, Inc., v. Pennzoil, Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 796 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987)
(emphasis added) (quoting Mason v. Rose, 85 F. Supp. 300, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), aff’d, 176
F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1949)).
79. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 29, at 56; see also Wright v. Mark C. Smith &
Sons, 283 So.2d 85, 93 (La. 1973) (“A court cannot enforce a contract to construct ‘sanitary
sewers’ with no further explanation.”); Varney v. Ditmars, 111 N.E. 822, 824 (N.Y. 1916)
(involving an agreement to pay an employee his salary plus a “fair share” of profits, and
concluding that the term did not lend itself to judicial enforcement because it required an
exercise in pure, subjective “conjecture”); see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 22, at 201
(indicating that contracts fail for indefiniteness when “the description of the subject matter is
inadequate, as where the description or quantity of goods to be sold is lacking”).
80. See MURRAY, supra note 22, at 97 (“Where . . . the parties contemplated agreeing
on a specific process for determining the price, i.e., their future agreement as to price, . . . a
court should not imply a ‘reasonable price’ since the parties have insisted upon a particular
process for determining a material term.”).
81. Sun Printing & Publishing Ass’n v. Remington Paper & Power Co., 139 N.E. 470,
471 (N.Y. 1923).
82. See Copeland v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 47 F.3d 1415, 1425 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he
record demonstrates that there was only an ‘agreement to agree’ . . . upon substantial
additional negotiation. Such agreements to agree, particularly absent material terms . . . are
unenforceable under Texas law . . . .”); Currituck Assoc. Residential P’ship v. Hollowell, 601
S.E.2d 256, 263 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a “contract is ‘nugatory and void for
indefiniteness’ if it leaves any ‘material portions open for future agreement’”), aff’d, 622
S.E.2d 493 (N.C. 2005); Fort Worth Indep. Sch. Dist. v. City of Forth Worth, 22 S.W.3d
831, 846 (Tex. 2000) (“It is well settled law that when an agreement leaves material matters
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Fourth, one should not assume that the latitude for gap-filling
runs equally wide for all types of agreements. Just as Professor Rau
sees no difference between interpretation and gap-filling, his recent
papers proceed on the assumption that exactly the same rules apply
to gap-filling in contracts and arbitration agreements. 83 However, the
doctrine of separability means that contracts and arbitration clauses
may be subject to regulation by sources of law that do not
completely overlap, 84 and this may produce some variations in the
gap-filling process. For example, in Stolt-Nielsen, the Supreme Court
recognized that while state contract law generally governs the
interpretation of arbitration agreements, “the [Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA)] imposes certain rules of fundamental importance,” which
apply only to the construction of arbitration agreements, which
channel the analysis, and which cannot be ignored. 85 As explained
below, this statutory overlay may limit the discretion of both courts
and
arbitrators
in
the
context
of
gap-filling
for
arbitration agreements. 86

open for future adjustment and agreement that never occur, it is not binding upon the parties
and merely constitutes an agreement to agree.”); Joseph Martin, Jr., Delicatessen, Inc. v.
Schumacher, 417 N.E.2d 541, 543 (N.Y. 1981) (“Dictated by these principles, it is rightfully
well settled in the common law of contracts in this State that a mere agreement to agree, in
which a material term is left for future negotiations, is unenforceable. This is especially true of
the amount to be paid for the sale or lease of real property.”); Four Eights LLC v. Salem, 194
S.W.3d 484, 486 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that “the parties basically made an
‘agreement to agree’ to something in the future, and such agreements have generally been held
unenforceable, both in this jurisdiction and others”); CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 29, at
53 (“The traditional rule is that an agreement to agree prevents the formation of a contract
[because] it shows the lack of present agreement.”); FARNSWORTH, supra note 22, at 120
(indicating that “[c]ourts have generally resisted” calls to supply material terms under
agreements to agree where the parties have not, in fact, reached agreement); MURRAY, supra
note 22, at 96 (“The cases are legion in which courts have held that such an ‘agreement to
agree’ upon a material term is not enforceable.”).
Some modern courts have held that an agreement to agree includes an implied promise to
negotiate in good faith. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 29, at 53. By contrast, where
parties have not agreed to agree, but have simply forgotten to include a material term, modern
courts seem much more inclined to supply the missing terms. MURRAY, supra note 22, at 96;
FARNSWORTH, supra note 22, at 120.
83. Rau, supra note 10, at 977–78; Rau, supra note 3, at 463–67.
84. BORN, supra note 4, at 411–12; LEW ET AL., supra note 1, at 107; DAVID ST. JOHN
SUTTON & JUDITH GILL, RUSSELL ON ARBITRATION 68 (22d ed. 2003); TWEEDDALE &
TWEEDDALE, supra note 44, at 217.
85. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 681 (2010)
(emphasis added).
86. See infra notes 167–93 and accompanying text.
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B. Do Arbitrators Mind the Gaps?
For international commercial arbitration, historical practice
traverses much of the terrain covered by the New York Court of
Appeals in Sun Printing. 87 Thus, according to a leading French text
on arbitration, traditional views clustered around the proposition
that the appointment of a third person to supply an omitted term:
(1) did not involve a “dispute” about the parties’ obligations; (2) did
not encompass a “judicial act”; and (3) therefore, did not constitute
arbitration within the meaning of applicable statutes and treaties. 88
To the contrary, the process of gap-filling had an exclusively
contractual nature with the result that the decision of the third party
only had the same legal status as the underlying contract. 89 Given
these perceptions, the International Chamber of Commerce adopted
a dispute-settlement process specifically designed for gap-filling and
adaptation of contracts during the late 1970s. 90 Consistent with
then-prevailing views, the process explicitly did not qualify
as “arbitration.” 91

87. 139 N.E. 470 (N.Y. 1923); see also supra notes 45–67 and accompanying text.
88. FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 25–26 (Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999) [hereinafter
FOUCHARD]; see also Bernini, supra note 36, at 196 (“The borderline between the award
stemming from . . . arbitration and the determination by a third . . . person touching upon
issues which are not justiciable in nature . . . becomes hard to trace. It is fair to submit that . . .
no definitive answer can be put forward . . . with the ensuing . . . uncertainty when . . . parties
are faced with . . . enforcement.”); R. Doak Bishop, A Practical Guide for Drafting
International Arbitration Clauses 57, http://www.kslaw.com/library/pdf/bishop9.pdf
(indicating that gap-filling and adaptation of contracts represent tasks that are “distinct from
the typical powers of an arbitrator”).
89. FOUCHARD, supra note 88, at 24.
90. FOUCHARD, supra note 88, at 27; see also International Chamber of Commerce,
Rules for Adaptation of Contracts (1978), ICC Publication No. 326; REDFERN & HUNTER,
supra note 44, at 539. According to one source, those rules enabled parties to “provide in
their contract that any gaps be filled, or the agreement adapted to changed circumstances, by
the procedure provided in the ICC Rules for Adaptation of Contracts.” Bishop, supra note 88,
at 57.
91. FOUCHARD, supra note 88, at 27; see also REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 44, at
539 (“The ICC has drawn up special rules for the adaptation of contracts, but also takes the
view that the role is not one best fulfilled by a conventional arbitral tribunal . . . .”); Bishop,
supra note 88, at 57 (“Those rules were distinct from the ICC Arbitration Rules; the
procedure provided by those rules was not an arbitral proceeding, and any resulting decision
was not an arbitral award and could not be enforced under the auspices of the New York
Convention.”). The ICC withdrew the rules in 1994, due to a complete lack of use for over
fifteen years. FOUCHARD, supra note 88, at 27; Bishop, supra note 88, at 57.
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Not surprisingly, proponents of international commercial
arbitration asserted that the exclusion of gap-filling from arbitration
did not meet the needs of modern international commerce.92
Consistent with such observations, certain European jurisdictions
adopted statutes recognizing that parties could agree to empower
arbitrators to fill gaps and even render awards on the adaptation of
contracts. 93 While some observers imply such agreements must take
the form of express contractual provisions, 94 the better view holds
that they may take the form of agreements to apply the proper law of
a jurisdiction that supports gap-filling. 95
As Klaus Peter Berger observes, however, most countries have
not adopted statutes expressly permitting agreements to include gapfilling within the scope of arbitration. 96 For arbitrations conducted in
such venues, one must refer back to the procedural and substantive

92. See FOUCHARD, supra note 88, at 25 (opining that “this narrow interpretation of
the arbitrator’s role does not reflect the practice or indeed the current needs of
international trade”).
93. See Bulgarian Law on International Commercial Arbitration, Art. 1(2) (1993),
http://www.bcci.bg/arbitration/lawofarbitr.htm (providing that “[i]nternational commercial
arbitration shall resolve civil property disputes resulting from international trade relations as
well as disputes for filling gaps in contracts . . . when the domicile or seat of at least one of the
parties is not in the Republic of Bulgaria”); Netherlands Arbitration Act, Art. 1020(4)(c)
(1986), http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/netherlands.arbitration.act.1986/1020.html (providing
that parties may agree to arbitrate questions involving the “filling of gaps in . . . the legal
relationship between the parties”); Swedish Arbitration Act, § 1 (1999),
http://www.sccinstitute.com/?id=23746 (providing that, “[i]n addition to interpreting
agreements, the filling of gaps in contracts can also be referred to arbitrators”).
94. See Berger, supra note 1, at 8 (indicating that “the perceived contractual and
creative nature of the arbitrator’s decision [on filling omitted terms] is said to require a specific
contract clause that contains an express authorization by the parties in addition to the usual
arbitration agreement”).
95. Cf. REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 44, at 537 (asserting that a “tribunal’s ability
to adapt a contract may derive from the law applicable to the substance of the dispute”); JEFF
WAINCYMER, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 1056 (2012)
(opining that “if the parties select a substantive law that does allow for rectification in
appropriate circumstances, such a right flows as a matter of course”); Bernini, supra note 36, at
194 (observing that adaptation of contracts “can be achieved” when “[t]here exists under the
applicable laws a system whereby a judge or arbitrator can be requested to give the necessary
directions even in the absence of contractual clauses to this effect”). According to one leading
source, the difference between gap-filling and adaptation “may only be a matter of degree,”
but tribunals should be more enthusiastic about gap-filling because “adding an additional
term” based on the presumed intent of the parties entails “a less speculative undertaking than
actually changing the contract to meet new circumstances.” REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note
44, at 537.
96. Berger, supra note 1, at 10.
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rules applied by local courts on the topic of gap-filling. 97 Based on
the principle of “synchronized competences,” 98 where courts at the
seat of arbitration have the capacity to fill contractual gaps, the
underlying controversies logically involve “disputes,” their resolution
involves “judicial acts,” and, therefore, gap-filling may also fall
within the scope of arbitration. This now seems to characterize the
legal position in jurisdictions like England, 99 France,100
and Germany. 101
Returning to the questions posed at the outset of Part II, neither
courts nor arbitrators historically had the authority to fill gaps
because gap-filling did not constitute a judicial, or justiciable, act.
However, as markets and transactions evolved along patterns more
likely to produce gaps, courts in the United States have taken on the
power to fill them. Based either on enabling statutes or the principle
of synchronized competence, arbitrators have followed a similar
course in cross-border disputes.
Thus, as a generalization, one may say that both courts and
arbitrators have the capacity for gap-filling, and they appear
comparably well-suited for the task, subject to a pair of
qualifications. First, at the level of competence, the gap-filling power
of arbitrators depends on a two-step analysis, in which one must find
authorization under both the lex causae and the lex arbitri to
determine that (1) the arbitrators have a substantive basis for gapfilling, and (2) the process qualifies as arbitration under the
governing procedural law. 102 Second, at the level of proficiency, to
the extent that gap-filling requires the identification of terms that
“comport[] with community standards of fairness and policy,” 103 it
seems possible that judges from within the community may possess

97. Id. at 10–11.
98. Id. at 10.
99. LEW ET AL., supra note 1, at 652 n.143.
100. FOUCHARD, supra note 88, at 29.
101. LEW ET AL., supra note 1, at 652 n.143; Berger, supra note 1, at 11.
102. See Berger, supra note 1, at 12. It is possible that analysis may require a third step to
determine whether courts at the likely place(s) of enforcement regard gap-filling as a subject
capable of settlement by arbitration. See Bishop, supra note 88, at 57 (opining that parties may
wish to “determine whether the arbitrators possess this power under . . . the law of the likely
country of enforcement”).
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
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greater familiarity with those standards than arbitrators drawn from
other jurisdictions. 104
Despite the qualifications just mentioned, international trends
seem to favor a rough parity between courts and arbitrators when it
comes to the legal capacity for gap-filling. This should come as
welcome news to parties engaged in complex, long-term, crossborder transactions, who should be no worse off in arbitration than
if they went to court. At least, that was the theory until Stolt-Nielsen,
in which the United States Supreme Court rendered a decision
widely believed to trim the gap-filling powers of arbitrators.
III. MINDING THE GAPS
Assuming that the gap-filling powers of arbitrators have
remained one of the most important and controversial topics in
international commercial arbitration for over a generation, the
process of specifying those powers requires a full measure of
attention to nuance. With that in mind, Part III uses Stolt-Nielsen to
illustrate the Supreme Court’s clumsy framing of certain points, as
well as the tendency of critics to gloss over parts of the opinion that
show greater respect for nuance and the gap-filling powers of
arbitrators. Thus, Section III(A) reviews the Supreme Court’s
decision in Stolt-Nielsen. Section III(B) surveys criticisms of the way
that decision frames the gap-filling powers of arbitrators. Finally,
Section III(C) argues that the critics of Stolt-Nielsen themselves have
overlooked important context and passages, both of which suggest
that the Supreme Court did not seriously trim the powers of
arbitrators to fill gaps in arbitration agreements and contracts.
A. Stolt-Nielsen
Based in New Jersey, AnimalFeeds International Corp.
manufactures and ships raw ingredients to animal-feed producers
around the world. 105 To that end, AnimalFeeds engages the services
104. See Pierre Mayer, Reflections on the International Arbitrator’s Duty to Apply the Law:
The 2000 Freshfields Lecture, 17 ARB. INT’L 234, 238 (2001) (observing that an international
arbitrator may often “have to apply a law other than that of the legal system in which he
himself is qualified,” that such laws “will represent a model with which he is hardly familiar,”
and that the temptation will be to “revert—as a result of a subconscious process—to what his
own law provides”).
105. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 666 (2010); Brief for
Respondent at 3, Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 662.
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of large, foreign shipping companies like Stolt-Nielsen, which
operate parcel tankers, or sea-going vessels with separate
compartments for customers that ship small quantities of liquid
products. 106 After the Department of Justice launched a criminal
investigation into a price-fixing conspiracy by parcel tanker
operators, AnimalFeeds brought a class action lawsuit against StoltNielsen and other operators in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 107 During the course of
litigation, however, respondents successfully obtained dismissal based
on the arbitration agreements contained in charter parties. 108
Subsequently, AnimalFeeds served Stolt-Nielsen and other parcel
tanker operators with a demand for class arbitration in New York.109
In due course, the parties agreed to submit the permissibility of class
arbitration to a panel of three experienced, international arbitrators
in accordance with the American Arbitration Association’s
Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitration. 110 At that stage, the
parties also stipulated that the arbitration clause was “silent” on the
topic of class arbitration. 111 AnimalFeeds clarified that this did not
simply mean the absence of an express contractual provision; to the
contrary, it meant that the parties had reached “no agreement” on
the topic of class arbitration. 112 Consistent with those
representations, the undisputed evidence showed that the particular
charter party form used by AnimalFeeds had never been used as the
foundation for class arbitration. 113 In addition, expert testimony
indicated that sophisticated, multinational companies like the parcel
tanker operators would never intend to subject themselves to class
arbitration. 114 Under these circumstances, course of performance,
course of dealing, and usage of trade provided no tools to fill the

106. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 666.
107. Id. at 667.
108. Id. at 668.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 668 (describing the procedural steps); id. at 688 & n.1 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (describing the panel as consisting of “experienced arbitrators,” all “leaders in the
international-dispute-resolution bar”).
111. Id. at 668.
112. Id. at 668–69.
113. Id. at 674.
114. Id. at 674 & n.6.
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silence. In other words, the arbitration clause contained a genuine
gap on the topic of class arbitration. 115
At this point, one must pause to emphasize that Stolt-Nielsen did
not involve a gap in the substantive terms of the contract, but in the
arbitration clause. 116 In this context, the normal rules on gap-filling
should apply, 117 with two qualifications. First, under the doctrine of
separability, the underlying contract and the arbitration clause
represent distinct agreements, each possibly having a different legal
status, and each possibly subject to regulation by different sources of
law. 118 Second, unlike the substantive provisions of the underlying
contract, the particular arbitration clause was regulated by the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 119 for at least three reasons: (1) the
arbitration clause expressly called for application of the FAA; 120 (2)
the arbitration had its seat in New York; 121 and (3) in the application
of gap-filling rules, the FAA would likely reflect “community

115. See supra notes 22–34 and accompanying text (identifying the differences between
interpretation and gap-filling).
116. See Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 666 (“We granted certiorari in this case to decide
whether imposing class arbitration on parties whose arbitration clauses are ‘silent’ on that issue
is consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act.”).
117. Cf. id. at 681 (indicating that the interpretation of arbitration agreements generally
falls under the normal state-law rules that govern the interpretation of contracts).
118. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
119. See Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 681 (while recognizing that state law generally
governed the interpretation of the arbitration clause, the Court emphasized that “the FAA
imposes certain rules of fundamental importance”).
120. See id. at 667 (quoting the arbitration clause, which stipulated that the arbitration
would be “conducted in conformity with the provisions and procedure of the United States
Arbitration Act,” which the Court understood to mean the FAA).
121. The arbitration clause provided for arbitration in New York. Id. AnimalFeeds
demanded arbitration in New York. Id. at 668. Thus the FAA applied because New York
represented the seat of arbitration. See BORN, supra note 44, at 306 (asserting that “the arbitral
seat plays an essential role in determining the legal framework for international arbitral
proceedings” because it “provides a mandatory legal framework applicable to the conduct of
the arbitral proceedings”); LEW ET AL., supra note 1, at 172 (opining that selection of the seat
of arbitration represents “one of the key issues” because it determines the procedural law
governing the arbitration, as well as the courts that can supervise the arbitration); REDFERN &
HUNTER, supra note 44, at 181 (explaining that the “seat of the arbitration is not merely a
matter of geography[;] [i]t is the territorial link between the arbitration itself and the law of
the place in which the arbitration is legally situated”) SUTTON & GILL, supra note 84, at 70
(emphasizing that the seat of arbitration “prescribes the procedural law of the arbitration”).
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standards of fairness and policy” within the meaning of Restatement
Section 204. 122
AnimalFeeds invited the tribunal to rule that the arbitration
clause, while silent on the topic, permitted class arbitration “as a
matter of public policy.” 123 Consistent with that request, the tribunal
reviewed a corpus of arbitral awards, drawn largely from consumer
arbitration, which demonstrated that other arbitrators “had
construed ‘a wide variety of clauses in a wide variety of settings as
allowing for class arbitration.’” 124 While it considered a line of federal
jurisprudence holding that the FAA prohibits consolidation of
arbitrations without the consent of the disputing parties, 125 the
tribunal concluded that extension of that jurisprudence to class
arbitration would eliminate the possibility of class arbitration barring
an express agreement among all parties and class members. 126
Apparently finding that conclusion to be distasteful, the tribunal
found no reason for departing from the prevailing “arbitral
consensus” and held that AnimalFeeds could proceed with class
arbitration against the parcel tanker operators. 127
After the tribunal rendered its award authorizing class
arbitration, the parcel tanker operators petitioned the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York to vacate the
award on the ground that the arbitrators had exceeded their
powers. 128 While the district court granted the petition, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. 129 On
further review, the Supreme Court began by describing the “high
hurdle” that one must clear to secure vacatur based on the theory

122. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(indicating that courts should fill gaps using terms that reflect “community standards of
fairness and policy”).
123. See Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 672 (quoting AnimalFeed’s submission to the
arbitral tribunal).
124. See id. at 669 (quoting the tribunal’s decision on class arbitration); see also id. at 675
n.7 (recounting an arbitrator’s statement that “the body of . . . arbitration awards on which
AnimalFeeds relied involved ‘essentially consumer non-value cases’”).
125. See, e.g., Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 275 (7th Cir. 1995); Gov’t of
United Kingdom v. Boeing Co., 998 F.2d 71, 74 (2d Cir. 1993).
126. See Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 675 n.7 (quoting the tribunal’s decision on
class arbitration).
127. Id. at 675.
128. Id. at 669; see also 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4).
129. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 669–70.
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that the arbitrators exceeded their powers. 130 Consistent with
prevailing international norms, the Court held that even serious legal
errors would not justify vacatur. 131 In the Court’s view, vacatur
becomes appropriate “only when [an] arbitrator strays from
interpretation and application of the agreement and effectively
‘dispense[s] his own brand of industrial justice.’” 132 Put in slightly
different terms, the “arbitrator’s task is to interpret and enforce a
contract, not to make public policy.” 133
Applying the standards set forth above, the Court concluded
“that what the arbitration panel did was simply to impose its own
view of sound policy regarding class arbitration.” 134 When faced with
the agreement’s absolute silence on the topic, 135 as well as the
absence of any relevant usage of trade, 136 the arbitrators should have
consulted the FAA, federal maritime law, or New York law to
determine whether any of those sources authorized “class arbitration
in the absence of express consent.” 137 Instead, the tribunal
“proceeded as if it had the authority of a common-law court to
develop what it viewed as the best rule to be applied in
such a situation.” 138
Turning to the FAA, which should have controlled the gapfilling exercise, 139 the Court recognized that while state law generally
governs the interpretation of arbitration agreements, “the FAA
imposes certain rules of fundamental importance, including the basic
precept that arbitration ‘is a matter of consent, not coercion.’” 140 As
a corollary, parties have the right to “specify with whom they choose
to arbitrate their disputes.” 141 Emphasizing the parity between courts
and arbitrators on this point, the Court stated: “It falls to courts and
130. Id. at 671.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 671–72 (quoting Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S.
504, 509 (2001)) (emphasis added).
133. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 672 (emphasis added).
134. Id. (emphasis added).
135. Id. at 668–69, 673.
136. Id. at 674 n.6.
137. Id. at 673.
138. Id. at 673–74 (emphasis added).
139. Id. at 673.
140. Id. at 681 (quoting Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)) (emphasis added).
141. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 683.
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arbitrators to give effect to these contractual limitations, and when
doing so, courts and arbitrators must not lose sight of the purpose of
the exercise: to give effect to the intent of the parties.” 142
Concluding its analysis, the Court held that “a party may not be
compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there
is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do
so.” 143 Given that the parties stipulated to the absence of any such
agreement, and given the absence of any relevant trade usage, the
tribunal’s authorization of class arbitration was “fundamentally at
war with the foundational FAA principle that arbitration is a matter
of consent.” 144
In perhaps the most important passage on gap-filling, the Court
recognized that, “[i]n certain contexts, it is appropriate to presume
that parties that enter into an arbitration agreement implicitly
authorize the arbitrator to adopt such procedures as are necessary to
give effect to the parties’ agreement.” 145 Quoting Restatement
(Second) of Contracts Section 204, the Court grounded its views “in
the background principle that ‘[w]hen the parties to a bargain
sufficiently defined to be a contract have not agreed with respect to a
term which is essential to a determination of their rights and duties,
a term which is reasonable in the circumstances is supplied by the
court.’” 146 However, the Court implied that it would not be
reasonable to supply class arbitration as a term because (1) that term
would be “at war” with the foundational principles of the FAA,147
and (2) class arbitration would draw in hundreds or thousands of
parties, thereby altering the basic nature of the proceedings
contemplated by bilateral arbitration agreements between two
contracting parties. 148
B. Criticisms of Stolt-Nielsen
In recent articles, leading U.S. academics have criticized StoltNielsen
for
expressing
“crabbed,” 149
“heavy-handed[],”150
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
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Id. at 684 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 684–85.
Id. at 685.
Id. at 684.
Id. at 685−87.
Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 6, at 1110.
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“troubling,” 151 “mystifying,” 152 “and even “startling” 153 views
regarding the gap-filling powers of arbitrators. For example,
Christopher Drahozal and Peter B. Rutledge draw attention to the
Court’s broad rhetoric, which depicts the powers of arbitrators (1) as
including the “interpretation,” “application,” and enforcement of
agreements, but (2) as excluding an arbitrator’s formulation of his or
her “own brand of industrial justice.” 154 In addition, Drahozal and
Rutledge repeatedly emphasize the Court’s statement that arbitrators
lack “the authority of a common-law court” to formulate what they
view as “the best rule” for permissibility of class arbitration. 155
For Drahozal and Rutledge, the clear implication is that StoltNielsen “trimmed” the capacity of arbitrators to fill gaps in
arbitration agreements, 156 because gap-filling would draw arbitrators
beyond the permissible scope of interpretation and into the
forbidden zone of articulating policy. 157 Although Stolt-Nielsen
recognized this taxonomy only in the context of arbitration
agreements, the Court’s broad rhetoric easily supports application of
identical principles to arbitral gap-filling in the underlying
contracts. 158 As a consequence, arbitrators logically possess
substantially more limited gap-filling powers than their judicial
counterparts. 159 This reading of Stolt-Nielsen spells trouble for
complex, long-term, cross-border transactions, in which contracts
seem both vulnerable to gaps and likely to provide for arbitration. 160
In a pair of thoughtful critiques, Alan Rau scolds the Court for
preventing arbitrators from using the full range of gap-filling rules

150. Id. at 1165.
151. Rau, supra note 3, at 454.
152. Id. at 469.
153. Id. at 473.
154. Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 6, at 1145 (quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 671 (2010)).
155. Id. at 1143, 1145−48.
156. Id. at 1109.
157. See id. at 1147 (“Apparently arbitrators can interpret contracts . . . , but lack the
same authority to develop common-law default rules as judges.”).
158. See id. at 1148 n.159 (“Although Stolt-Nielsen did not deal with a decision by the
arbitrators on the merits of the case, its rationale—that arbitrators lack the authority of
common law courts to make decisions on the basis of public policy—raises questions about
arbitrators’ authority to fill gaps in contracts . . . on substantive issues.”).
159. See id.
160. See supra notes 36, 43–44 and accompanying text.
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available under state contract law, leaving them with fewer gap-filling
tools than their judicial counterparts. Focusing on what he describes
as “the most mystifying sentence to be found in any opinion ever
written by the Supreme Court on the subject of arbitration,” 161 Rau
directs particular scorn at the Court’s indication that arbitrators lack
“‘the authority of a common-law court.’” 162 In his view, this means
that arbitrators must “stop well short of the usual judicial work of
construction.” 163 Likewise, he chides the Court for directing
arbitrators to consult the FAA and other sources for default rules
when faced with “silence” on the topic of class arbitration. 164 In his
view, this passage stands for the “startling” implication that
arbitrators must be “powerless to spin out . . . their own” gapfillers. 165 Finally, he accuses the Court of ignoring a “meta-default
rule” to the effect that the parties entrust their arbitrators with wideranging powers to determine the form that the proceedings
should take. 166
Offered by some of the country’s most thoughtful arbitration
scholars, the foregoing criticisms of Stolt-Nielsen demonstrate the
need for courts to be attentive when framing rules on the gap-filling
powers of arbitrators. The criticisms also reveal the Supreme Court’s
failure to meet that standard of attentiveness in Stolt-Nielsen, the
Court’s clumsy framing of arbitrators’ powers, and consequent
perceptions that the decision may transform arbitration into an
inferior dispute-settlement process.
C. Context and Nuance
After several readings of Stolt-Nielsen, however, it seems evident
that scholarly criticisms gloss over context and passages that support
more generous views regarding the gap-filling powers of arbitrators.
These include the facts that (1) the particular case involved an
arbitration clause regulated by the FAA, (2) the Supreme Court did
not in fact draw a distinction between the gap-filling capacities of
161. Rau, supra note 3, at 469; Rau, supra note 10, at 978.
162. Rau, supra note 3, at 469 (quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.,
559 U.S. 662, 673 (2010)); Rau, supra note 10, at 978, 981.
163. Rau, supra note 3, at 469; Rau, supra note 10, at 978.
164. See Rau, supra note 3, at 472; Rau, supra note 10, at 981.
165. Rau, supra note 3, at 473 (emphasis added); Rau, supra note 10, at 981
(emphasis added).
166. Rau, supra note 3, at 473; Rau, supra note 10, at 982.
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courts and arbitrators, and (3) the Supreme Court did in fact
recognize that arbitrators may exercise gap-filling powers as provided
in the Restatement.
1. Relevance of statutes
Despite Professor Rau’s criticism of the Supreme Court’s
insistence that the arbitrators should have referred to the FAA as part
of the gap-filling exercise in Stolt-Nielsen, the fact is that statutes
often provide definitive instructions on gap-filling. As Rau points
out, the Uniform Commercial Code contains numerous gap-fillers
for omitted terms, 167 including default rules on price and location of
delivery. 168 When confronted with those sorts of gaps in sales
transactions governed by the UCC, both courts and arbitrators
presumably have obligations to apply the relevant statutory
provision. 169 In other words, when statutes control the parameters of
gap-filling, courts and arbitrators simply must follow the law. 170
Applying the principles just mentioned, it seems crucial to recall
that Stolt-Nielsen involved gap-filling in the context of an arbitration
agreement regulated by the FAA in three separate ways: (1) the
clause itself expressly called for application of the FAA; (2) the
arbitration had its seat in New York; and (3) the FAA would likely
reflect “community standards of fairness and policy” in any gapfilling exercise under Section 204 of the Restatement. 171 Against this

167. See Rau, supra note 3, at 463 (noting that “much of the UCC in fact consists of
presumptions to which we necessarily default in reading an agreement”); Rau, supra note
10, at 972.
168. U.C.C. §§ 2-305, 2-308 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977).
169. Cf. Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law
Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 NYU L. REV. 1, 8, 18–19 (1995) (observing
that “‘common law judging’ now takes places in a ‘world of statutes,’” and that “statutory
interpretation is [now] likely the principal task engaged in by state courts.”). At the time she
wrote the article, Kaye was Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals. Id. at 1.
170. See BORN, supra note 44, at 2139 (insisting that “arbitrators are mandated to apply
and uphold the law”); Mayer, supra note 104, at 235, 247 (“A new kind of arbitration, based
on law, has emerged, as part of which the arbitrator is supposed to apply the rules of law laid
down by the legislator. . . . [A]n arbitrator should consider it his duty . . . to comply with the
law . . . .”); see also Mayer, supra note 104, at 236 (“The duty of a judge is also to uphold the
law.”); cf. Saul Zipkin, A Common Law Court in a Regulatory World, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 285,
289 (2013) (“A common law court operating within a common law world differs markedly
from a common law court acting in a legal landscape characterized by regulatory law and
aggregate harms.”).
171. See supra notes 120–22 and accompanying text.
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background, the Supreme Court recognized that state law generally
governs the interpretation of arbitration agreements, but that the
process still requires application of “certain rules of fundamental
importance” imposed by the FAA, including the principle that
“arbitration ‘is a matter of consent, not coercion.’” 172 Identification
of the parties with whom one agrees to arbitrate represents a central
aspect of that consent. 173
Because the parties to the bilateral arbitration agreement in StoltNielsen had “no agreement” on class arbitration, 174 and because class
arbitration would vastly and involuntarily expand the range of parties
involved in a single proceeding, 175 the Supreme Court concluded
that the tribunal’s authorization of class arbitration both lacked a
“contractual basis” and was “fundamentally at war with the
foundational FAA principle that arbitration is a matter of consent.”176
One may interpret this holding in two ways. First, the Supreme
Court arguably held that the tribunal’s ruling on class arbitration
ignored and violated a mandatory norm limiting the tribunal’s
jurisdiction. 177 On this view, the precedential scope of Stolt-Nielsen
might extend only to gap-filling of jurisdictional terms in arbitration
agreements, and not the substantive terms of contracts. 178
Second, in Stolt-Nielsen, the Supreme Court arguably held that
the tribunal ignored all relevant sources of law and simply imposed its
own view of the best resolution of a particular issue, 179 which would
172. See supra notes 85, 140 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 141, 148 and accompanying text.
174. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 669 (2010).
175. See id. at 683–84, 686–87.
176. Id. at 664–65, 684.
177. See Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 6, at 1145 (“Given the Court’s emphasis on
ensuring that parties not be required to arbitrate if they have not agreed to do so, the StoltNielsen opinion might be limited to class arbitration and comparable, essentially jurisdictional,
issues.”) (emphasis added). But see Rau, supra note 3, at 450 (deeming it only “marginally
conceivable that the question [of class arbitration] could be taken to implicate to some degree
the very existence or validity of consent to the arbitration process”).
178. Under this view, the holding of Stolt-Nielsen would not even extend to the gapfilling powers of arbitrators for non-jurisdictional procedural questions, such as dispositive
motions and confidentiality. See Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 6, at 1164 (supporting a
reading of Stolt-Nielsen that limits the Court’s decision to “class arbitration and not . . . the
procedural gap-filling powers of arbitrators more generally.”).
179. See supra notes 134–44 and accompanying text; see also Oxford Health Plans LLC v.
Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2068 (2013) (“Only if ‘the arbitrator act[s] outside the scope of his
contractually delegated authority’—issuing an award that ‘simply reflect[s] [his] own notions of
[economic] justice’ rather than [drawing on sources of law]—may a court overturn his
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not even constitute a law-based decision, but amiable composition
performed without the consent of the parties. 180 Importantly, that
situation would justify vacatur of the tainted decision, whether
involving jurisdictional or substantive issues, because in either case
the tribunal would have exceeded its powers by adopting “a
fundamentally different arbitral procedure than that agreed by the
parties.” 181 Understood from that perspective, the precedential scope
of Stolt-Nielsen would extend to unprincipled gap-filling both in the
context of arbitration agreements and the substantive terms
of contracts.
It is possible that the facts of Stolt-Nielsen support both of the
interpretations proposed above. This seems consistent with the
Supreme Court’s more recent observation in Oxford Health Plans
LLC v. Sutter that Stolt-Nielsen left open the question of whether the
availability of class arbitration represents a “gateway” issue sounding
in jurisdiction, subject to de novo judicial review. 182 Evidently, the
Court felt that it could leave the question open because the facts in
Stolt-Nielsen supported vacatur whether one viewed class arbitration
as raising jurisdictional or non-jurisdictional issues. 183 In either case,

determination.”) (emphasis added) (quoting Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Mineworkers,
531 U.S. 57, 62 (2000)).
180. See BORN, supra note 44, at 2238 (defining service as “amiable compositeur” and
arbitration “ex aequo et bono” to reflect the “essential principle . . . that arbitrators are not
obliged to decide . . . in accordance with a strict application of legal rules; rather, the
arbitrators are expected to decide in light of general notions of fairness, equity and justice”);
LEW ET AL., supra note 1, at 471 (indicating that when parties authorize tribunals to act as
amiables compositeurs or to decide cases ex aequo et bono, the arbitrators must “decide
according to fairness and common sense principles” and may “ignore any applicable law
rules”). According to one observer, it may not be all that unusual for arbitrators to feel the
temptation to “render an award that meets their personal standard of justice rather than the
letter of the law.” MARGARET M. MOSES, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 82 (2d ed. 2012); see also Mayer, supra note
104, at 247 (recognizing that arbitrators must often deal “with the temptation to
rule in equity”).
181. See BORN, supra note 44, at 2600 (explaining that when “an arbitral tribunal which
is not granted amiable compositeur authority nonetheless renders an award not based on legal
principles,” courts may vacate the awards for excess of jurisdiction because the tribunal has
“adopted a fundamentally different arbitral procedure than that agreed by the parties”); see also
WAINCYMER, supra note 95, at 1045 (“The ICSID Convention expressly indicates that a
tribunal acting ex aequo et bono without authority would be subject to annulment.”).
182. Oxford Health Plans, 133 S. Ct. at 2068 n.2.
183. In Stolt-Nielsen, the Supreme Court concluded only that the arbitrators “exceeded
[their] powers” within the meaning of 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds
Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 672 (2010). As explained by two noted observers, an excess of
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the point is that when statutes regulate a particular issue, arbitrators
exceed their powers by saying “‘to hell with’ the applicable law” and
applying contrary principles based solely on their own views of the
proper outcome. 184 The point hardly seems controversial. 185
2. Courts and tribunals
While critics argue that Stolt-Nielsen draws a distinction between
the gap-filling powers of courts and arbitrators, 186 such assertions
seem demonstrably inaccurate. To the contrary, when discussing the
need to respect the FAA’s “fundamental” emphasis on “consent,”187
including the question of “with whom” the parties have chosen to
arbitrate, 188 the Court emphasized the parity of restrictions imposed
on courts and arbitrators: “It falls to courts and arbitrators to give
effect to these contractual limitations, and when doing so, courts and
arbitrators must not lose sight of the purpose of the exercise: to give
effect to the intent of the parties.” 189 Quoting this language, a federal
court in California recently emphasized that Stolt-Nielsen imposes
the same requirements on “both courts and arbitrators, without
distinguishing their respective roles.” 190

powers “is of a different nature” than “lack of substantive jurisdiction.” SUTTON & GILL,
supra note 84, at 387. In particular, “[j]urisdiction goes to the tribunal’s mandate whereas an
excess of powers need not.” Id. Thus, a tribunal with jurisdiction over a matter may exceed its
powers by taking certain procedural steps, such as appointing experts or consulting lawyers,
contrary to the agreement of the parties. Id.
184. Rau, supra note 3, at 472; Rau, supra note 10, at 981; see also Transcript of Oral
Argument, infra note 215, at 26 (Breyer, J.) (indicating that “totally ignoring plain law is a
ground for reversing an arbitrator, even an arbitrator”). In Stolt-Nielsen, the Court assumed for
the sake of argument that “manifest disregard” of the law (1) survived as ground for vacatur,
and (2) required a showing that the tribunal “knew of the relevant [legal] principle,
appreciated that this principle controlled the outcome of the disputed issue, and nonetheless
willfully flouted the governing law by refusing to apply it.” Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 672 n.3.
(alteration in original). Tellingly, the Court found that the facts satisfied the threshold for relief
under that standard. Id.
185. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 155, 159, 162–63 and accompanying text.
187. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 681–84.
188. Id. at 683.
189. Id. at 684 (emphasis added).
190. Lee v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 982 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1113 (C.D. Cal. 2013); see
also Sonic Auto., Inc. v. Price, No. 3:10-CV-382, 2011 WL 3564884, at *13 (W.D.N.C. Aug.
12, 2011) (“It follows that those involved in the administration of arbitration proceedings,
both courts and arbitrators, must strive to, ‘give effect to the contractual rights and
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Likewise, in Stolt-Nielsen, the Court did not state that arbitrators
lack the gap-filling powers of courts, or even common-law courts, in
general. In this regard, one should bear two points in mind. First,
the Supreme Court chose its words carefully: it referred to the
“authority of a common-law court,” 191 which historically meant the
authority to exercise a leading role in social governance through
judicial development of legal principles without having to take
statutes into account. 192 Second, and more importantly, the Court
criticized the arbitral tribunal for acting as if it had the “authority of
a common-law court” in a particular context. Thus, having just held
that the tribunal should have consulted the FAA, federal maritime
law, or possibly New York law to fill the gap on class arbitration, the
Court noted that the tribunal failed to do so and, instead, acted “as
if it had the authority of a common-law court to develop what it
viewed as the best rule to be applied in such a situation.” 193
In other words, the Court held that where a federal statute
controls the process of gap-filling, arbitrators lack the traditional,
open-ended capacity of common-law courts to make up rules based

expectations of the parties.’”) (quoting Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford
Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)).
191. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 673–74 (emphasis added).
192. As one writer explains, English common law developed in the early seventeenthcentury as part of an effort to counteract the “claims of increasingly powerful monarchs.”
KUNAL M. PARKER, COMMON LAW, HISTORY, AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 1790-1900 28
(2011). In the process, common-law principles concentrated the power to declare law in the
hands of judges, and identified that law more directly with “the people.” Id. at 29. Over time,
English common law judges came to assert that their decisions might also “limit the reach of
statutes.” Id. at 32. Thus, in one case, Coke wrote that “when an Act of Parliament is against
common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law will
controul it, and adjudge such Act to be void.” Id. at 32–33 (quoting Bonham’s Case, 77 Eng,
Rep. 646, 652 (C.P. 1610)).
With respect to the historical development of the common law in the United States, the same
writer asserts that “the common law was considered an integral mode of governance and
public discourse” from the time of “the American Revolution until the very end of the
nineteenth century.” Id. at 1; see also Zipkin, supra note 170, at 292 (“Historians have shown
that in the pre-Civil War period the common law instantiated a framework of governance.”).
During that period, before the proliferation of statutes and the consolidation of state
structures, U.S. common-law courts had wide-ranging powers to “shape regulation in
nineteenth-century America through a distinctly judicial form.” Zipkin, supra note 170, at
293; see also PARKER, supra, at 3, 18 (referring to the absence of “extensive state structure” as
a condition that supported development of the common law during the nineteenth century,
and recording the decline of the common law as a mode of governance following shifts
towards “state-generated law” during the twentieth century).
193. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 673–74 (emphasis added).
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on their own policy preferences. In analogous circumstances, federal
courts would also lack the authority of common-law courts. 194
Likewise, even state courts, which retain a broader range of
common-law powers, lack the capacity to ignore controlling statutes
and to make up contrary rules based on their own perceptions of
right and wrong. 195 Again, the point hardly seems controversial.
In short, the point is that the Supreme Court did not establish a
general distinction between the gap-filling powers of courts and
arbitrators in Stolt-Nielsen. To the contrary, it emphasized the parity
of requirements imposed on courts and arbitrators to respect the
FAA’s emphasis on consent when addressing the range of parties to
be joined in a single proceeding. 196 Furthermore, when criticizing the
tribunal for “proceed[ing] as if it had the authority of a common-law
court,” 197 the Supreme Court did so in a context where the tribunal
194. Cf. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001) (“Raising up causes of action
where a statute has not created them may be a proper function for common-law courts, but
not for federal tribunals [interpreting federal statutes].”) (quoting Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind,
Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 365 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment)). The Supreme Court made this absolutely clear in Stolt-Nielsen
when it emphasized that “courts and arbitrators” have identical obligations to respect
contractual limitations on consent, and to honor the FAA’s purpose to give effect to the intent
of the parties. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 684.
195. In a modern “statutory world,” common-law courts must respect and apply
constitutionally-enacted legislation. See Kaye, supra note 169, at 18–19 (indicating that
“statutory interpretation is likely the principal task engaged in by state courts”); Ellen Ash
Peters, Common Law Judging in a Statutory World: An Address, 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 995, 996
(1982) (reporting that a mere ten percent of recent cases decided by the Connecticut Supreme
Court qualified as “purely common law cases”) [hereinafter Peters, Common Law Judging].
Even in traditional common-law fields, such as contracts and torts, legislatures have adopted
statutes that control the process of judicial decision-making. See Kaye, supra note 169, at 8
(indicating that “even in traditional common-law fields like torts, contracts, and property we
often confront statutes that affect our decisionmaking”); Peters, supra, at 996 (reporting that
“the role of statutes is just as crucial in litigation involving so-called common law subjects,
such as torts, contracts, property, and procedure, as elsewhere”).
As a result, even common-law courts have become reluctant to develop the common law in
ways that would result in major policy shifts, preferring to leave such undertakings to the
legislative process. Kaye, supra note 169, at 9. In other words, “[a] common law court
operating within a common law world differs markedly from a common law court acting in
a . . . landscape characterized by regulatory law . . . .” Zipkin, supra note 170, at 289. Again,
the Supreme Court made this absolutely clear in Stolt-Nielsen when it emphasized that “courts
and arbitrators” have identical obligations to respect contractual limitations on consent and to
honor the FAA’s purpose to give effect to the intent of the parties. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at
684. Presumably, the Court’s assessment applies to all courts, state and federal, in
controversies regulated by the FAA.
196. See supra notes 142, 189–90 and accompanying text.
197. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 673–74.
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had ignored controlling statutes and had formulated contrary rules
based on its own policy preferences. 198 In analogous circumstances,
the same criticisms would apply to federal and state courts. 199 Thus,
when viewed with a full measure of attention to nuance, the
Supreme Court recognized no general distinction between the gapfilling capacities of courts and arbitrators.
3. Explicit recognition of gap-filling powers
In a passage not mentioned by Professors Drahozal, Rutledge, or
Rau, the Supreme Court opinion in Stolt-Nielsen (1) explicitly
recognized the gap-filling powers of arbitrators and (2) tied them
back to the standards that appear in Section 204 of the Restatement.
Towards the end of its opinion, the Supreme Court observed that
the tribunal’s ruling on class arbitration lacked a “contractual basis”
and was “fundamentally at war with the foundational FAA principle
that arbitration is a matter of consent.” 200 Immediately following that
passage, however, the Supreme Court initiated a discourse that
recognizes the gap-filling powers of arbitrators in terms that echo
Professor Rau’s “meta-default rule” on the subject. 201 Thus, the
Court stated, “In certain contexts, it is appropriate to presume that
parties that enter into an arbitration agreement implicitly authorize
the arbitrator to adopt such procedures as are necessary to give effect
to the parties’ agreement.” 202
Further clarifying the gap-filling powers possessed by arbitrators,
the Court identified Section 204 of the Restatement as the
relevant source:
This recognition is grounded in the background principle that
“[w]hen the parties to a bargain sufficiently defined to be a
contract have not agreed with respect to a term which is essential

198. See supra notes 134–44, 171–81 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 189–90, 194–95 and accompanying text.
200. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 684.
201. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
202. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 684–85. Compare Rau, supra note 3, at 473 (referring to
“a ‘meta-default rule’ [that] informs every feature of our law of arbitration— . . . a background
rule to the effect that by submitting to the process, the parties in cases of ‘silence’ have
presumptively entrusted to their arbitrators a wide-ranging power to determine just what form
their proceeding will take”).
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to a determination of their rights and duties, a term which is
reasonable in the circumstances is supplied by the court.” 203

In other words, when the Court spoke most clearly and directly
about the capacity of arbitrators to supply omitted terms, it invoked
the same basic standards applied by U.S. judges for
over a generation.
Despite the Court’s recognition that arbitrators may apply the
sorts of gap-filling rules set forth in the Restatement, it should be
evident that those principles could not sustain the tribunal’s ruling in
Stolt-Nielsen. To begin with, there was no indication that the
tribunal even purported to apply the Restatement, or anything like
it, in filling the contract’s silence on class arbitration. Furthermore,
the tribunal’s endorsement of class arbitration clearly did not satisfy
the Restatement’s requirement that judicially supplied terms be
“reasonable in the circumstances.” 204 To begin with, the Supreme
Court expressly declared the non-consensual imposition of class
arbitration to be “at war” with controlling requirements of the
FAA, 205 meaning that the tribunal’s decision did not “comport[]
with community standards of fairness and policy.” 206 Furthermore,
class arbitration would not fall within the reasonable expectations of
the parties because (1) the relevant charter-party form had never
been used to sustain class arbitration, 207 (2) the parcel tanker industry
had no usage or custom supporting class arbitration, 208 and (3) the
extension of a bilateral arbitration clause to encompass hundreds or
thousands of parties fundamentally changed the “nature” of the
arbitral process. 209
Simply put, Stolt-Nielsen does not restrict, but expressly
endorses, gap-filling by arbitrators along the lines set forth in the
Restatement, subject to outer limits imposed by the FAA on courts
and tribunals alike. Although the Court’s explicit discussion of the
Restatement’s standards may seem limited, the Court had little

203. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 685 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
204 (AM. LAW INST. 1981)).
204. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
205. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 684.
206. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
207. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 674.
208. Id. at 674 & n.6.
209. Id. at 685–87.
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occasion to say more because the tribunal did not purport to apply
the gap-filling powers set forth in the Restatement and, in any event,
adopted conclusions not reconcilable with the exercise of
those powers.
IV. EPILOGUE: ARBITRATORS AT LARGE?
Having raised the alarm about Stolt-Nielsen, the strict limits
supposedly placed on arbitral gap-filling, and the correspondingly
enhanced likelihood of vacatur of awards by reviewing courts, Alan
Rau now claims that the Supreme Court quickly liberated arbitrators
from those constraints in Oxford Health Plans, LLC v. Sutter. 210 In
Rau’s view, the Court’s decision in Oxford Health Plans sets
arbitrators “at large” by vesting them with interpretive powers
simultaneously wide enough to pull agreements on class-wide
arbitration out of thin air, and vigorous enough to resist judicial
review. 211 Thus, he sees Stolt-Nielsen as a “hill” that the Court briskly
climbed then descended, 212 though by a needlessly confusing and
circuitous route. 213
While discussion of Oxford Health Plans draws this Article
beyond the topic of arbitral gap-filling and more into the specificities
of debates associated with class arbitration, assessment of that case
represents a useful step, both to address claims regarding the demise
of Stolt-Nielsen and to illustrate the continuing tendencies of
observers to gloss over nuances in Supreme Court pronouncements
regarding the powers of arbitrators to interpret or to fill gaps in
arbitration agreements. Developing both of these points, it seems
evident that Professor Rau overestimates the extent to which the
Supreme Court has retreated from Stolt-Nielsen, and the degree to
which arbitrators possess unrestricted licenses to interpret arbitration
agreements to permit class-wide arbitration following Oxford
Health Plans.

210. See Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2067 (2013); Rau, supra
note 10, at 1000.
211. See Rau, supra note 10, at 989–97, 999–1000.
212. Id. at 1000.
213. See id. at 1000–01 (describing the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence as a “dizzying
series of twists and turns” that ultimately establishes a wide remit for arbitrators to make
determinations about the availability of class arbitration, but that also create “obvious
incentives for [arbitrators] to be . . . less than candid with respect to the true rationale of
their awards”).
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To lay the foundation for analysis, one must begin with the facts
of the dispute in Oxford Health Plans. In that case, a physician
agreed to charge prescribed rates when treating participants in a
managed-care network. 214 Following several years of performance,
the physician brought a class action lawsuit in New Jersey state
courts, alleging that the health insurance company failed to make
timely and full payments to him and roughly 20,000 class
members. 215 Instead of answering the complaint, the health insurance
company moved to compel arbitration in accordance with the
following clause of its agreement with the physician: “No civil action
concerning any dispute arising under this Agreement shall be
instituted before any court, and all such disputes shall be submitted
to final and binding arbitration in New Jersey, pursuant to the rules
of the American Arbitration Association with one arbitrator.” 216
Based on its understanding of Supreme Court precedent in
2003, the health insurance company asserted that the state court
should allow the arbitrator to make a decision on the availability of
class-wide arbitration “in the first instance.” 217 Agreeing with the
health insurance company, the state court referred the matter to
arbitration, including the question of whether the particular
arbitration clause authorized class arbitration.218
During the arbitration proceedings, the health insurance
company filed an application requesting the arbitrator to decide that
the arbitration clause did not provide for class-wide proceedings.219
Despite the absence of any language expressly mentioning the

214. Oxford Health Plans, 133 S. Ct. at 2067.
215. Id.; see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Oxford Health Plans, 133 S. Ct.
2064 (No. 12-135), 2013 WL 2337933, at *35 [hereinafter Transcript of Oral Argument]
(indicating that the class might include all “20,000 physicians who had signed the same
agreement” with Oxford Health Plans); Brief for Petitioner at *2–3, *6, Oxford Health Plans,
133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013) (No. 12-135), 2013 WL 244026, at *2–*3, *6 [hereinafter Brief for
Petitioner] (setting forth the chronology of the relationship and indicating that the class might
include as many as 20,000 New Jersey physicians).
216. See Oxford Health Plans, 133 S. Ct. at 2067.
217. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 215, at *4; Transcript of Oral Argument, supra
note 215, at *4–5.
218. Sutter v. Oxford Health Plans LLC, 675 F.3d 215, 217 (3d Cir. 2012); see also Brief
for Respondent at 6, 27, Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013) (No. 12135), 2013 WL 662696, at *6, *27 [hereinafter Brief for Respondent].
219. Brief for Respondent, supra note 218, at *27.
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possibility of class arbitration, 220 the arbitrator used the following
interpretive moves to conclude that the arbitration clause endorsed
class-wide proceedings. First, the arbitration clause excluded the
parties from commencing civil actions relating to their agreement
before any state or federal court. 221 Second, with a pleasing
symmetry, the clause also provided for arbitration of any civil action
excluded from litigation. 222 Third, because class actions represent
“one of the possible forms of civil action that could be brought in a
court,” the arbitration clause on its face provided for
class arbitration. 223
Several years later, after Stolt-Nielsen came down but while class
arbitration proceedings dragged on in Oxford Health Plans, the
health insurance company filed a second application asking the
arbitrator to rule that the arbitration clause did not authorize classwide proceedings. 224 The arbitrator confirmed his original decision,
after which the health insurance company requested the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey to vacate the
award on the grounds that the arbitrator exceeded his powers under
9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). 225 The district court denied the motion, and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed on the
grounds that the arbitrator made a good-faith effort to interpret the
arbitration agreement. 226 Once the arbitrator used interpretive tools
to locate a contractual basis for class-wide arbitration, courts lacked
the power to second-guess that decision, even if based on serious
errors of law. 227
On further review before the Supreme Court, the health
insurance company described the arbitrator’s decision as “irrational”
and, thus, not capable of withstanding scrutiny “under any standard
of review.” 228 By contrast, the physician argued that the only
question under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) was whether the arbitrator had

220. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 215, at *21 (“Nothing in the text of the parties’
arbitration clause refers in any way to class proceedings . . . .”).
221. Oxford Health Plans, 133 S. Ct. at 2067; Sutter, 675 F.3d at 223.
222. Oxford Health Plans, 133 S. Ct. at 2067; Sutter, 675 F.3d at 223.
223. Oxford Health Plans, 133 S. Ct. at 2067.
224. Id.; Sutter, 675 F.3d at 218; Brief for Respondent, supra note 218, at 28.
225. Oxford Health Plans, 133 S. Ct. at 2067–68; Sutter, 675 F.3d at 218, 223.
226. Oxford Health Plans, 133 S. Ct. at 2068; Sutter, 675 F.3d at 218, 220, 224–25.
227. Oxford Health Plans, 133 S. Ct. at 2068; Sutter, 675 F.3d at 220, 224−25.
228. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 215, at *12, *14, *26, *39.
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exceeded his powers. 229 Viewed from that perspective, it seemed
dispositive that the health insurance company asked the arbitrator to
interpret the arbitration clause twice and that the arbitrator rendered
a decision based on his interpretation of the clause. 230 While the
arbitrator might have decided rightly or wrongly, the physician
emphasized that the arbitrator acted within his powers. 231
In weighing the parties’ arguments, the Supreme Court
indicated that it viewed the substance of the arbitrator’s decision
as indefensible.
The remainder of Oxford’s argument addresses merely the
merits: [t]he arbitrator, Oxford contends at length, badly
misunderstood the contract’s arbitration clause. . . . The arbitrator
thought that clause sent to arbitration all “civil action[s]” barred
from court, and viewed class actions as falling within that category
. . . But Oxford points out that . . . a class action is not a form of
“civil action,” as the arbitrator thought, but merely a procedural
device that may be available in a court. At bottom, Oxford
maintains, this is a garden-variety arbitration clause, lacking any of
the terms or features that would indicate an agreement to use class
procedures. . . . Nothing we say in this opinion should be taken to
reflect any agreement with the arbitrator’s contract interpretation,
or any quarrel with Oxford’s contrary reading. 232

However, the Court concluded that arbitrators have the power
to interpret contracts, that the parties in Oxford Health Plans had in
fact requested the arbitrator to interpret the arbitration agreement,
and that the arbitrator arguably performed the task conferred on
him. 233 Therefore, the arbitrator did not exceed his powers for
purposes of 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). 234 With that threshold issue
resolved in favor of the arbitrator, his decision prevailed, even if it
included grave errors. 235

229. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 215, at *23; Brief for Respondent, supra
note 218, at *18.
230. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 215, at *24, *26–27, *30–31; Brief for
Respondent, supra note 218, at *14, *30.
231. Brief for Respondent, supra note 218, at *18–19, *33.
232. Oxford Health Plans, 133 S. Ct. at 2070.
233. Id. at 2069–71.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 2070–71.

38

01.BROWER.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

1

8/4/2016 6:05 PM

Mind the Gap

Writing some nine months after the Court released its decision in
Oxford Health Plans, Alan Rau opined that the Court had set
arbitrators back “at large.” 236 So long as the parties did not stipulate
to the complete absence of any agreement whatsoever on class
arbitration, arbitrators could use interpretive tools to identify
contractual bases for class procedures. In so doing, they could use
reasons that seemed “facially preposterous” and that would “make a
first-year law student blush,” all without exposing the substance of
their decisions to judicial review. 237 In other words, arbitrators could
return to the business of pulling justifications for class arbitration out
of thin air.
To emphasize the logical implications of Oxford Health Plans,
Rau notes that in thirteen of fourteen recent proceedings
administered by the American Arbitration Association, arbitrators
have found a contractual basis for class-wide arbitration. 238 In most of
those decisions, Rau describes the arbitrators’ reasoning as “wacky,”
if not “truly disingenuous.” 239 Perhaps with a sense of vindication,
however, Rau describes this series of arbitral decisions as “perfectly in
line” with his “expansive” views regarding the gap-filling authority
of arbitrators. 240 In addition, he asserts that Oxford Health Plans left
arbitrators with considerably broader powers than common law
courts, 241 at least in the sense that arbitrators may pull justifications
for class-wide arbitration out of thin air without fear of judicial
second-guessing, provided they do so under the color of interpreting
the parties’ arbitration clause. In Rau’s view, this means that all but
“the most unwary, clumsy or naive” arbitrators will find some way
around Stolt-Nielsen. 242
While sensible up to a point, Rau’s most recent analysis seems
open to familiar lines of criticism. To begin with, its exclusive
reliance on an emerging “arbitral jurisprudence” resembles an
approach that the Supreme Court spurned in Stolt-Nielsen. 243 As

236. Rau, supra note 10, at 990–1000.
237. See id. at 992–94, 997–60, 63.
238. Id. at 996.
239. Id. at 997.
240. Id. at 1000.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 1001.
243. See id. at 1001 (drawing conclusions about Oxford Health Plans based on “the
current state of arbitral jurisprudence”).
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discussed above, the parties in Stolt-Nielsen concluded an arbitration
agreement, but reached no agreement on the availability of classwide proceedings. 244 Despite a stipulation that the parties’ arbitration
clause was “silent” on the class arbitration issue, 245 the arbitral
tribunal held that it possessed the authority to order class
arbitration. 246 In justifying its decision, the tribunal relied on the fact
that other arbitrators had construed “a wide variety of clauses in a
wide variety of settings as allowing for class arbitration.” 247 While the
tribunal also recognized the existence of “court cases denying
consolidation of arbitrations,” it did not regard those precedents as a
basis for departing from the emerging “arbitral consensus” regarding
the availability class arbitration. 248
However, when the award made its way to the Supreme Court in
Stolt-Nielsen, the majority strongly implied that the tribunal placed
too much emphasis on a perceived “arbitral consensus” and
improperly glossed over unfavorable judicial precedents, and that this
pair of miscalculations played a role the Court’s decision to vacate
the tribunal’s award on class arbitration. 249 Likewise, Rau’s near-total
reliance on a series of arbitral rulings seems troubling, particularly
when combined with a tendency to gloss over unfavorable judicial
pronouncements reflected both in Oxford Health Plans and in
subsequent decisions by United States Courts of Appeals.
Turning to the question of unfavorable judicial pronouncements,
Rau pays scant attention to a nuance that renders Oxford Health
Plans an unlikely basis for sweeping conclusions about the Supreme
Court setting arbitrators “at large” to make decisions about the
availability of class arbitration. Students of the Court’s arbitration
jurisprudence will know about the existence of “gateway” questions,
which involve disputes about whether, how, or with whom an
arbitration will proceed. 250 They will also know that the Court has
divided gateway questions into two categories: “questions of

244. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 667–69 (2010).
245. Id. at 668–69.
246. Id. at 669.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 674–75.
249. See id. at 673–75.
250. See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83–85 (2002) (discussing
various categories of “potentially dispositive gateway question[s]” relating to the institution
and continuation of arbitration proceedings).
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arbitrability” and “procedural questions,” 251 the latter of which some
lower courts have come to call “subsidiary questions.” 252 The
distinction becomes important because questions of arbitrability are
presumptively for courts to decide, 253 either in the first instance, 254 or
on de novo review absent “clear[] and unmistakabl[e]” evidence that
the parties wanted an arbitrator to resolve the issue. 255 Importantly,
merely submitting a question of arbitrability to the arbitrator does
not cross the required threshold; to the contrary, there must be clear
and unmistakable evidence that the parties wanted the arbitrator to
make a conclusive determination, and did not intend to preserve their
entitlement to de novo review. 256
By contrast, “procedural” or “subsidiary” questions are
presumptively for arbitrators to decide, 257 subject only to the limited
and highly deferential review that normally applies to arbitral awards
and that focuses on upholding the integrity of the arbitral process. 258
For example, courts may generally inquire if tribunals have exceeded
their powers, whether tribunals have committed gross violations of
fundamental procedural norms, or whether their decisions have been

251. See id. at 83–84; see also RESTATEMENT OF THE U.S. LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 2-7 reporters’ note (b)(i) (AM. LAW INST., Council Draft No.
4, 2014) (describing the distinction between “substantive” and “procedural” questions of
arbitrability in Supreme Court jurisprudence).
252. See, e.g., Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Crockett, 734 F.3d 594, 597 (6th Cir. 2013).
253. Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2068–69 n.2 (2013);
Howsam, 537 U.S. at 83.
254. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 946 (1995) (indicating
that parties who resist arbitration based on questions of arbitrability may apply to courts for
injunctive relief at an early stage in the proceedings); Reed Elsevier, 734 F.3d at 596 (involving
a claim seeking declaratory relief in order to prevent an arbitrator from making decisions on
questions of arbitrability).
255. Oxford Health Plans, 133 S. Ct. at 2068–69 n.2 (quoting AT&T Techs., Inc. v.
Commc’ns Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)).
256. See First Options of Chicago, Inc., 514 U.S. at 946 (“But merely arguing the
arbitrability issue to an arbitrator does not indicate a clear willingness to arbitrate that issue,
i.e., a willingness to be effectively bound by the arbitrator’s decision on that point.”).
257. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 84; Reed Elsevier, 734 F.3d at 597.
258. See MOSES, supra note 180, at 205–07 (explaining that most jurisdictions limit the
grounds for challenging arbitral awards to questions of jurisdiction and procedural integrity);
REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 44, at 616 (indicating that “most States are broadly content
to restrict the challenge of arbitral awards to excess of jurisdiction and lack of due process”); see
also LEW ET AL., supra note 1, at 665 (describing the availability of proceedings to challenge
awards as a “guarantee” that “inspires the confidence of the parties in the arbitration process”)
(emphasis added).
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affected by corruption or bias. 259 However, this narrow and
deferential standard of judicial review leaves virtually no room for
consideration of the merits. 260
Students of the Court’s arbitration jurisprudence will also recall
the dividing lines generally drawn between questions of arbitrability
and procedural questions. Questions of arbitrability embrace a
narrow range of issues associated with consent: 261 whether a party has
consented to arbitration at all, 262 whether it has consented to
arbitration of a particular dispute, 263 or whether it has consented to
arbitration with a particular counterparty. 264 By contrast, procedural
or subsidiary questions typically embrace issues that “grow out of the
dispute and bear on its final disposition.” 265 Such issues may include
controversies about notice, waiver, and time limits, all of which may
affect whether and how the proceedings will go forward. 266
Returning to the topic of class arbitration, everyone seems to
agree that the availability of class-wide proceedings represents a key,
threshold issue that should be decided at an early stage and seems
likely to shape the character of the proceedings. They disagree,
however, on whether the availability of class-wide arbitration raises a
259. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)–(4); see also Michael Kerr, Arbitration and the Courts: The
UNCITRAL Model Law, 34 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 15 (1985) (describing proceedings to
challenge the award as a “bulwark against corruption, arbitrariness, [and] bias”).
260. See MOSES, supra note 180, at 205, 207–08 (indicating that “in most jurisdictions
there is no right to appeal if the arbitrators made a mistake of law or of fact,” but identifying a
small number of narrow and controversial exceptions); see also LEW ET AL., supra note 1, at 665
(explaining that a proceeding to challenge an award “cannot and should not amount to a
review of the merits”).
261. RESTATEMENT OF THE U.S. LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
§ 2-7 reporters’ note (b)(i) (AM. LAW INST., Council Draft No. 4, 2014).
262. Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2068–69 n.2 (2013); Reed
Elsevier, 734 F.3d at 597.
263. Oxford Health Plans, 133 S. Ct. at 2068–69 n.2; Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002).
264. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 683 (2010) (“We
think it is also clear from our precedents and the contractual nature of arbitration that parties
may specify with whom they choose to arbitrate their disputes.”); Howsam, 537 U.S. at 84
(explaining that “a gateway dispute about whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration
clause raises a ‘question of arbitrability’ for a court to decide”) (emphasis added); First Options
of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943–46 (1995) (involving an argument that
individuals were not parties to an arbitration agreement between two corporate entities, and
treating the issue as a question of arbitrability).
265. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 84 (quoting John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S.
543, 557 (1964)).
266. Id. at 84–85.
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question of arbitrability, or a procedural question. Proponents of the
first view argue that it represents a question of arbitrability because it
raises the question of “with whom” the parties have consented to
arbitrate: a single opponent or thousands of adversaries.267
Proponents of the second view assert that it represents a subsidiary
question because the parties typically stipulate that they have
consented to arbitration and the only question is whether the
arbitration will proceed in the form of a class action, which
represents a procedural device. 268
Given the outcome in Oxford Health Plans, one might possibly
conclude that the Supreme Court either explicitly or implicitly
identified the availability of class arbitration as a procedural question,
which would in fact have set arbitrators “at large” to interpret
arbitration agreements. However, Oxford Health Plans involved a
nuance that the parties and the Court ventilated almost entirely in
footnotes, that prevented the Court from addressing the proper
designation of class arbitration, and that makes it premature to
render sweeping pronouncements regarding the freedom of
arbitrators to interpret arbitration clauses to permit classwide proceedings.
In its opening brief for Oxford Health Plans, the health insurance
company observed that the Court’s reasoning in Stolt-Nielsen
seemed consistent with the proposition that the availability of class
arbitration involves a question of arbitrability presumptively for
courts to resolve either in the first instance, or on de novo review of
arbitration awards. 269 However, the health insurance company also
disclosed that Oxford Health Plans would not present an opportunity
for the Court to develop its jurisprudence on gateway issues. 270 Based
267. Opalinski v. Robert Half Int’l Inc., 761 F.3d 326, 332–33 (3d Cir. 2014); Reed
Elsevier, 734 F.3d at 598–99.
268. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452–53 (2003) (plurality
opinion) (indicating that the availability of class arbitration “concerns neither the validity of the
arbitration clause nor its applicability to the underlying dispute between the parties”;
explaining that “the question is not whether the parties wanted a judge or an arbitrator to
decide whether they agreed to arbitrate a matter”; emphasizing that “the relevant question here
is what kind of arbitration proceeding the parties agreed to”; and concluding that the question
“concerns contract interpretation and arbitration procedures”). But see Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S.
at 680, 687 (emphasizing that the views stated in Bazzle only constituted a plurality opinion,
and doubting whether the fundamental differences between bilateral arbitration and class
arbitration simply encompass different “procedural mode[s]”).
269. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 215, at *38 n.9.
270. Id.
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on its understanding of case law in 2003, the health insurance
company had not submitted the question of arbitrability to a court
for determination in the first instance. 271 Subsequently, the health
insurance company had not argued for de novo review of the
arbitrator’s decision in the lower courts. 272 Therefore, it had waived
the opportunity to build on helpful concepts articulated in StoltNielsen, 273 including dicta to the effect that class-wide arbitration
represents something more than a procedural tool, that it vastly
expands the universe of potential counterparties and, therefore, that
it raises the question of “with whom” one consents to arbitrate. 274
Given the posture of the case, the health insurance company had
no choice but to argue that the arbitrator’s interpretation of the
arbitration agreement to permit class arbitration was so poorly
reasoned, and so fundamentally wrong, that it could not survive
under any standard of review. 275 As already noted, the physician
replied that the only question was whether the arbitrator had
exceeded his powers. 276 Viewed from that angle of appreciation, it
seemed dispositive that the parties had asked that arbitrator to
interpret the arbitration agreement, and that the arbitrator had done
so. 277 Under these circumstances, the Court accepted that the
arbitrator had acted within the powers conferred on him. 278 The
Court could not go on to evaluate the substance of the arbitrator’s
interpretation, as that issue lay completely outside the scope of
review established by 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). 279
Although the Court accepted the physician’s arguments for the
purposes of the case, it immediately laid down a footnote
emphasizing that it “would face a different issue if Oxford had
argued below that the availability of class arbitration is a so-called
‘question of arbitrability.’” 280 In such a case, the Court would have
more options at its disposal, including the possibility of reserving

271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
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Id.; see also supra note 217 and accompanying text.
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 215, at *38 n.9.
Id.
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 686–87 (2010).
See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 233–34 and accompanying text.
See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2068–69 n.2 (2013).
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such determinations presumptively for judges, 281 which would not
mean setting arbitrators “at large,” but curtailing their role either by
cutting them out of the picture entirely, 282 or by subjecting their
decisions to de novo review. 283 In other words, the Court recognized
that Oxford Health Plans arose in an unusual posture, which severely
limited the range issues and, perhaps, the value of the decision as a
predictor of what the Court might do given full range of motion.
Under these circumstances, it seems premature to declare that the
Court has set arbitrators “at large” to make their own decisions
regarding the availability of class arbitration.
Assuming that the Court has not set arbitrators “at large,” but
has expressly reserved judgment on the presumptive distribution of
power between courts and arbitrators, the question becomes how
lower courts are shaping the state of play. Again, Rau glosses over
unfavorable judicial pronouncements, including the fact that the only
United States Courts of Appeals squarely to address the issue have
held that the availability of class arbitration represents a question of
arbitrability presumptively reserved for judicial determination.
Tellingly, this includes the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, which consciously switched positions in the wake of
Oxford Health Plans.
Months before Rau expressed his assessment of Oxford Health
Plans, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
declared that the Supreme Court had not set arbitrators at large to
make determinations about the availability of class arbitration. In
Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Crockett, a lawyer concluded a subscription
agreement with LexisNexis, which contained an arbitration clause.284
Believing that LexisNexis had unjustifiably overcharged him, the
lawyer filed a demand for class arbitration and sought $500 million
in damages. 285 Instead of responding to the demand, LexisNexis
commenced a lawsuit in federal court, seeking a judicial
determination that the arbitration clause in the subscription
agreement did not permit class-wide arbitration proceedings. 286 In
281. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
282. See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
283. See Oxford Health Plans, 133 S. Ct. at 2068–69 n.2; see also supra note 255 and
accompanying text.
284. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Crockett, 734 F.3d 594, 596 (6th Cir. 2013).
285. Id.
286. Id.
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the judicial proceedings, the lawyer asserted that the arbitrator
possessed the right to determine the availability of class arbitration.287
Thus, resolution of the judicial proceedings depended on whether
the availability of class arbitration represents a question of
arbitrability to be decided by judges, or a subsidiary question to be
decided by arbitrators. 288
When the issue reached the Sixth Circuit, the panel recognized
that “the Supreme Court’s puzzle of cases on this issue is not yet
complete,” but opined that “the Court has sorted the border pieces
and filled in much of the background.” 289 In its assessment of
Supreme Court jurisprudence, the Sixth Circuit explained that “the
Court has given every indication, short of an outright holding,” that
the availability of class-wide arbitration represents a question of
arbitrability “rather than a subsidiary one.” 290 As evidence of that
trend, the Sixth Circuit noted the Court had recently emphasized
the “fundamental” differences between bilateral and class-wide
arbitration, including the vastly increased time and cost of class-wide
proceedings, the loss of confidentiality in class-wide proceedings, and
exposure to bet-the-company damages in class-wide proceedings
without the prospect of judicial review. 291 Contributing its own gloss
to the division between questions of arbitrability and subsidiary
questions, the Sixth Circuit explained that the former encompass
questions that “are fundamental to the manner in which the parties
will resolve their dispute,” whereas the latter “concern details.”292
Applying that distinction, the Sixth Circuit emphasized that
“whether the parties arbitrate one claim or 1,000 in a single
proceeding is no mere detail.” 293 In fact, the availability of class
arbitration seemed “vastly more consequential” than the question of
whether the parties ever agreed to bilateral arbitration in the first
place because “[a]n incorrect answer in favor of classwide arbitration
would ‘forc[e] parties to arbitrate’ not merely a single ‘matter that
they may well not have agreed to arbitrate[,]’ but thousands of

287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
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them.” 294 Viewed from this perspective, designation as a question of
arbitrability became inevitable. 295
Turning to the United States Court of Appeals which produced
Oxford Health Plans, in the years leading up to the Supreme Court’s
decision in that case, panels of the Third Circuit stated in published
and unpublished opinions that the availability of class-wide
arbitration entailed “a question of interpretation and procedure for
the arbitrator.” 296 While these assertions temporarily supplied cover
to district courts inclined to take the same position in other
jurisdictions, 297 the Third Circuit repudiated them as unsupported
dicta during the second half of 2014.
In Opalinski v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc., two employees
commenced a class-action lawsuit against the defendant corporation
on the grounds that it had improperly failed to pay them overtime
wages. 298 Instead of answering, the corporation moved to compel
arbitration of the employees’ claims on an individual basis.299
Consistent with the published and unpublished Third Circuit
opinions on the topic, the district court referred the parties to
arbitration, but held that the propriety of bilateral or class-wide
arbitration represented an issue for the arbitrator to decide. 300 On
appeal, a panel of the Third Circuit held that the court’s previous
statements on the topic were not supported by reasons, were mere
dictum, and were not even reconcilable with Supreme Court
decisions on which they relied. 301
Approaching the issue with fresh eyes, the Third Circuit
recognized that questions of arbitrability fall into two categories: (1)
disputes regarding the identity of parties covered by arbitration
agreements, and (2) disputes regarding the categories of claims

294. Id. at 599 (quoting Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002)).
295. Reed Elsevier, 734 F.3d at 599.
296. See Quilloin v. Tenet HealthSys. Phila., Inc., 673 F.3d 221, 232 (3d Cir. 2012); see
also Vilches v. Travelers Cos., 413 F. Appx. 487, 491–92 (3d Cir. 2011).
297. See infra notes 311–13 and accompanying text (discussing the reliance of some
district courts on Third Circuit precedent to justify the conclusion that the availability of class
arbitration involves a procedural question for determination by arbitrators as opposed
to courts).
298. Opalinski v. Robert Half Int’l Inc., 761 F.3d 326, 329 (3d Cir. 2014).
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 331–32.
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covered by arbitration agreements. 302 In the Third Circuit’s view, the
availability of class-wide arbitration falls into both categories, because
it determines (1) the range of parties covered by the arbitration
clause, and (2) the range of controversies encompassed by the
arbitration clause. 303
While the employees asserted that class arbitration simply reflects
a procedural tool, the Third Circuit emphasized that the Supreme
Court definitively rejected that logic in Stolt-Nielsen, where the
Court opined that class-wide arbitration did not merely alter the
range of procedural tools, but transformed the entire character of the
dispute-settlement process. 304 For all these reasons, the Third Circuit
reversed the trial court’s order, 305 which had refused to vacate the
arbitrator’s award authorizing class-wide arbitration. 306 Again, this
seems hardly consistent with the assertion that arbitrators have been
set “at large” to make such determinations in the wake of Oxford
Health Plans.
Looking beneath the apparent uniformity of views among
United States Courts of Appeal, a more complicated picture
emerges. In recent published and unpublished opinions, a United
States District Court and a state appellate court in California have
concluded that the availability of class arbitration represents a
question of arbitrability presumptively for courts to decide. 307 In
reaching that conclusion, the United States Court for the Central
District of California emphasized that its decision fell perfectly in line
with the conclusions reached by the “only two circuits to squarely
address the question.” 308 In a very recent unpublished opinion,
Ohio’s Court of Appeals also chose to fall in line with Opalinski and
Reed Elsevier, emphasizing the latter case in apparent recognition of
the Sixth Circuit’s geographical scope. 309

302. Id. at 332.
303. Id. at 332–33.
304. Id. at 333–34.
305. Id. at 335–36.
306. Id. at 329.
307. See Chico v. Hilton Worldwide, Inc., No. CV 14-5750-JFW, 2014 WL 5088240, at
*11 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2014); Garden Fresh Rest. Corp. v. Super. Ct., 180 Cal. Rptr. 3d 89,
95 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
308. Chico, 2014 WL 5088240, at *11.
309. Bachrach v. Cornwell Quality Tools Co., No. 27117, 2014 WL 7454687, at *3–4
(Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2014).
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In published and unpublished opinions, United States District
Courts in California, Illinois, Minnesota, and New York reached the
opposite conclusion, holding that the availability of class-wide
arbitration represents a subsidiary question for arbitrators to
decide. 310 Three of those four cases, however, came down before the
Third Circuit reversed course in Opalinski. 311 Two of the district
courts emphasized the existence of a split between the Third and
Sixth Circuits, 312 which allowed the district courts to portray their
own decisions as reasonable conclusions falling within the parameters
of a debate among circuit courts. While a fourth case came down
after Opalinski, the district court inexplicably attributed the Third
Circuit’s older decisions to the Tenth Circuit, 313 which permitted the
district court to imply that its own views still fell in line with one
branch of an active circuit split. That misattribution and the failure
to recognize the disappearance of a circuit split represents an
astonishing lapse that does not inspire confidence in the district
court’s reasoning, or its conclusions.
Perhaps more importantly, even while a circuit split existed,
many district courts did not express unalloyed confidence when
deciding to treat the availability of class arbitration as a subsidiary
question for arbitrators to decide. For example, judges from the

310. See Lee v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 982 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1113–14 (C.D. Cal.
2013); see also Harrison v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, LLC, Civil No. 12-2145
ADM/TNL, 2014 WL 4185814, at *3–4 (D. Minn. Aug. 22, 2014); In re A2P SMS
Antitrust Litig., No. 12 CV 2656(AJN), 2014 WL 2445756, at *10–12 (S.D.N.Y. May 29,
2014); Williams-Bell v. Perry Johnson Registrars, Inc., Case No. 14 C 1002, 2014 WL
7499398, at *5–6 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 2014).
311. See Lee, 982 F. Supp. 2d at 1113–14; see also In re A2P SMS Antitrust Litig., 2014
WL 2445756, at *10–12; Williams-Bell, 2014 WL 7499398, at *5–6.
312. See Lee, 982 F. Supp. 2d at 1113–14; see also In re A2P SMS Antitrust Litig., 2014
WL 2445756, at *9–11. In the third case, the court cited almost no decisions other than
opinions of the United States Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, and United States District Courts for the Northern District of Illinois. See
Williams-Bell, 2014 WL 7499398, at *5–8 (citing decisions from the courts just mentioned, as
well as one decision each from United States District Courts for the Eastern District of New
York and the Southern District of New York).
313. See Harrison, 2014 WL 4185814, at *3–4 (recognizing the unification of Third
Circuit and Sixth Circuit precedent following Opalisnki, but opining that the “Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals has held arbitrators should decide the availability of class arbitration,” and
citing the case as Quilloin v. Tenet HealthSys., Phila., Inc., 673 F.3d 221, 232 (10th Cir.
2012)) (emphasis added). As noted above, Quilloin was decided by the Third Circuit and
should have been cited as Quilloin v. Tenet HealthSys., Phila., Inc., 673 F.3d 221, 232 (3d Cir.
2012). See supra note 296 and accompanying text.
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Northern District of Illinois recognized that the issue had “divided
judges in this district,” 314 emphasized the absence even of a districtwide “judicial consensus,” 315 and gently implored the Seventh Circuit
to “provide more clarity about who decides if class claims are
arbitrable.” 316 In another case, a judge in the Southern District of
New York described the issue as a “close one,” recognized that “the
availability of class arbitration is plausibly an issue that contracting
parties might expect a court to resolve,” and admitted that the
arguments supporting that view gave her “some pause.” 317 These
qualified statements show that the district court judges harbored at
least a margin of doubt regarding the accuracy of their conclusions.
Now that the split between the Third and the Sixth Circuits has
disappeared in a manner that emphatically designates class arbitration
as a question of arbitrability, one suspects that district courts would
feel an even keener sense of doubt in adopting the contrary view.
Returning to Alan Rau’s assessment of Oxford Health Plans, one
may conclude that he greatly exaggerated the demise of Stolt-Nielsen
and the extent to which arbitrators should feel themselves “at large”
to order class arbitration based on creative interpretations of
arbitration agreements. 318 A proper reading of Oxford Health Plans
does not support his conclusions. 319 The only decisions on point by
United States Courts of Appeals positively refute his conclusions.320
While the state of play among United States District Courts seems
more fluid, 321 the decisions that support Rau’s views contain
astonishing errors, 322 express doubts, 323 and may have been overtaken
by the disappearance of a circuit split. 324 While all of this may still
leave a degree of uncertainty regarding the trajectory of

314. Williams-Bell, 2014 WL 7499398, at *5.
315. Price v. NCR Corp., 908 F. Supp. 2d 935, 944 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
316. Williams-Bell, 2014 WL 7499398, at *8.
317. In re A2P SMS Antitrust Litigation, 2014 WL 2445756, at *11–12. In its most
recent decision on the topic, even the United States District Court for the District of
Minnesota recognized that “there is room arguing class arbitration is a ‘gateway’ matter”
presumptively for judicial resolution. Harrison, 2014 WL 4185814, at *5.
318. See Rau, supra note 10, at 992–1004.
319. See supra notes 250–83 and accompanying text.
320. See supra notes 284–306 and accompanying text.
321. See supra notes 307–17 and accompanying text.
322. See supra note 313 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 314–17 and accompanying text.
324. See supra notes 296–306, 311–13 and accompanying text.
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jurisprudence, that is the idea: arbitrators cannot assume that they
have a wide remit to pull class-wide arbitration out of thin air,
whether one frames the exercise as filling gaps or interpreting
arbitration agreements.
In the final analysis, the point is not that the Supreme Court has
unjustifiably trimmed the gap-filling powers of arbitrators, either
with respect to arbitration agreements or the underlying contracts. 325
As explained above, a nuanced reading of Stolt-Nielsen does not
support that view. 326 The point is also not whether the Supreme
Court has become indulgent in allowing arbitrators to pull class
arbitration out of thin air under the color of interpreting arbitration
clauses. 327 A thorough reading of Oxford Health Plans does not
support that view, 328 and lower court decisions substantially
refute it. 329
The point is, when it comes to arbitration agreements, gap-filling
and interpretation take place in the context of a statutory overlay, 330
in which the FAA imposes certain rules of fundamental
importance. 331 These include the principles that arbitration is a
matter of consent, 332 that the parties expect judges to make final
decisions with respect to consent, 333 and that judges will
presumptively decide (either in the first instance or on de novo
review) whether the parties consented to arbitration, 334 with whom
they consented to arbitrate, 335 and the range of disputes they
consented to arbitrate. 336 This modest exercise in gatekeeping
ensures that the parties receive the arbitration—and only the
arbitration—to which they have agreed. On this narrow range of
issues, judicial control seems desirable particularly in the field of class
proceedings, where arbitrators have self-serving incentives to

325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.

See supra notes 156–66 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 168–209 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 210–13, 236–42 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 250–83 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 284–309 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 85–86, 140, 172 and accompanying text.
See id.
See supra notes 140, 172 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 253, 261 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 253–55, 262 and accompanying text.
See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
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maximize the size, complexity and significance of the matters before
them. 337 As Michael Reisman observed, too much autonomy in this
context leads to abuse, discourages parties from submitting
important disputes to capricious decision-making, and ultimately
threatens the judicial commitment to summary enforcement
proceedings for arbitration awards. 338 Given these perils, disputes
about the scope of consent to arbitration represent a zone where no
one should aspire to set arbitrators “at large.”
CONCLUSION
Coming full circle, contractual gap-filling by arbitrators remains
an important and controversial topic. As discussed above, gap-filling
controversies may arise with particular frequency in international
commercial arbitration for the simple reason that long-term,
complex, cross-border transactions seem prone both to lapses in
foresight and to incorporation of arbitration clauses. On this subject,
as on other thorny topics, the general trajectory of the law seems
clear, but the details remain confounding and poorly understood.339
Viewed at a high level of generality, gap-filling increasingly has
become recognized as a respectable tool for arbitrators, both as a
matter of substantive law on contracts and procedural law on
arbitration. Moving to the level of detail, and focusing on the United
States, it remains a confounding task to define where the gap-filling

337. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 215, at *42 (quoting Justice Kennedy,
expressing concerns about the conflict of interest for arbitrators who could choose either to
arbitrate a single matter bilaterally for $10,000 or to authorize class arbitration, draw the
proceedings out for eleven years, and collect a million dollars in fees). In Oxford Health Plans,
the health insurance company made the same point in its brief:
Moreover, class arbitration determinations are ones that even the best-intentioned
arbitrator may find it difficult to approach with complete impartiality . . .
[A]rbitrators—unlike judges—are compensated by the parties before them, typically
based on the time devoted to resolving a particular matter. They thus have a direct,
inevitable, and significant financial interest in decisions concerning the availability of
class arbitration because any determination to proceed on a class basis will
substantially increase the length and scope of the proceedings. Brief for Petitioner,
supra note 215, at *37–38.
338. W. MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION
AND ARBITRATION 113 (1992).
339. See Charles H. Brower, II, International Decision: Republic of Austria v. Altmann,
99 AM. J. INT’L L. 236, 239 (2005) (“Also, while states may understand the broad outlines of
state immunity at any given time, they can have little confidence in the details that control the
outcome of specific cases.”).
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powers of arbitrators begin, and where they end. A trip to the
Supreme Court in Stolt-Nielsen and the ensuing commentary only
seem to have complicated the matter by suggesting that U.S. courts
have abandoned a desirable, globally-recognized trajectory.
However, a properly attentive reading of the Court’s judgment
reveals a more generous view of gap-filling by arbitrators, and
confirms that legal developments in the United States remain
on course.
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